Showing posts with label liberal economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label liberal economics. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 10, 2007

Why Karl Marx Supported Libertarianism

by K. Bolton


The term “new Right” in New Zealand and other English-speaking countries is a misnomer and contrary to the way it is applied in Continental Europe. While the term is applied invariably to libertarianism in the English speaking world, it is neither “new” nor “right”.

Libertarianism, free trade, call it what you will, is the reanimated corpse of 19th Century Whig liberalism. The latter, far from being of the “right” or conservative, is antithetical to it. Whig liberalism, what we now call libertarianism, is the doctrinal manifestation of the Industrial Revolution. Its antecedents can be traced back to the Cromwellian Revolution of the 17th Century, a revolt by a newly emerging merchant class against the authority of the monarchy and gentry.

While in terms of our Western civilization it was the first such revolt to be undertaken in the name of the masses, but for the covert benefit of business interests, the French Revolution had the same purpose on the Continent. Both unleashed politically the desire of the merchant to be unfettered by the moral impulse of tradition, to pursue their business interests as they saw fit, without regard to any loyalty beyond profit.

Against these early manifestations of libertarianism stood the partisans of tradition. Conservatism stood for the estate and the rural community against the city, the machine, and the power of money. Conservatism upheld the moral authority of religion against humanism and the relegation of the human being to nothing but “matter in motion”. It defended the monarchy as a unifying focus against the destructiveness of class war. The ideals of noblesse oblige, of duty, of the chivalric concept of protection and obedience, were its basis of social relations rather than dog-eat-dog economics. Work as an ethic and a cultural manifestation, rather than as a mechanical function, was reflected in the old guild concepts.

With the rise of the city, the machine, the bank, and the expansion of the merchant class arose also the proletariat – dispossessed artisans and yeomen. The traditionalist forces represented by conservatism stood pressed between the workers’ movement from below and the plutocracy from above. The workers’ movement was a necessary response to the very real grievances of the uprooted urban proletariat under the libertarian regime of the workhouse, child labour, slum dwellings and cholera. Some traditionally minded individuals and institutions championed the workers’ cause.

The Conservatives, led by Joseph Chamberlain formed the Trade Protection League in 1903 to oppose the free market and champion the British worker. (In New Zealand 1930s Labour maverick John A Lee encountered the opposition of his “socialist” colleagues who thought that trade protectionism was contrary to “International brotherhood”, albeit more a “brotherhood of plutocracy”than of the worker).

Alternatives to both plutocratic libertarianism and socialistic nationalisation were proposed, including monetary reform (e.g. social credit). Catholic social doctrine (called ‘solidarism’) as exemplified by the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum), posited a rejection of socialism and capitalism as materialistic, and advocated a wider distribution of property ( whence the Distributist movement of Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton). The recreation of the medieval guilds was advocated as a basis for organic social harmony. Such doctrines found an influential voice in the Catholic press in Depression era New Zealand, yet today what prelate advances any socio-economic option beyond crypto-Marxism?

Unfortunately, the “alternative” that triumphed was, until recent years, Marxism, and variants of materialistic socialism such as Fabianism. That they did triumph against the alternatives that were gaining mass support should give pause for thought. For example, why did all the socialist movements from Fabianism to communism have such a ready flow of funds? That the so-called proletarian movements were in the pay of “big capital” was a phenomenon that has been commented on by sundry historians from conservative Oswald Spengler to liberal Carroll Quigley.*

Marxism was very much a product of English economics; the mirror image of the free trade school. It arose with the rise of Darwinism, which was taken from the strictly biological field and applied to economics by both the Marxists and the libertarians. Hence, this economic Darwinism posited history as nothing more than economic development along lineal-progressive (i.e. “evolutionary” ) lines. Both doctrines were based upon economic determinism, upon the materialistic conception of history and human social relations. The materialistic conception is antithetical to such organic bonds as family, nation, and culture. To the Marxist these are “bourgeois” concepts. To the libertarian they are expressions of “collectivism,” and stand in the way of the individual who is complete and sovereign unto himself. While today’s libertarians see themselves and are seen by their foes as the antithesis of socialism, they have this materialistic pedigree in common with the Left.

Marx looked favourably upon free trade capitalism, because it did indeed disrupt those organic bonds that had to be buried before Marxism could triumph. Thus Marx saw the subversive potential of libertarianism. The Marxist historical outlook is dialectical. It sees history in terms of a continuing dialectic of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The basis of Marxist dialectics is class struggle. Hence the thesis was the old order of ‘feudalism”; the antithesis was capitalism, and from the clash of these opposites would arise the new synthesis of communism.

This is why orthodox Marxist theorists hold that socialism can only arise from an industrialised capitalist country with a large proletariat. Hence the first stage in the dialectical march to communism is capitalism, which prepares the ground for communism. (The mainly agrarian nature of the communist revolutions in China and Cuba caused theoretical problems for communists).

Free trade is the crucial element of the Marxist dialectic, without which there can be no clash of opposites, and therefore no communism arising from the “class struggle”. Few Marxists are open about this seemingly paradoxical support for the subversive nature of libertarianism. Trotskyite publications can, however, be seen adhering to this line when they attack trade protectionism as preserving “national capitalism” and therefore delaying the dialectic that will lead to Communist revolution.

Marx wrote of the subversive role of free trade in the dialectical process when he stated in The Communist Manifesto: “National differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to the freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production, and in the conditions of life pertaining thereto.”

Previously, in 1847 (Appendix to Elend der Philosophie) Marx had written:

"Generally speaking, the protectionist system today is conservative, whereas the free trade system has a destructive effect. It destroys the former nationalities, and renders the contrasts between proletariat and bourgeoisie more acute. In a word, the free trade system is precipitating the social revolution. And only in this revolutionary sense do I vote for free trade."


We see Marx’s prophecy being fulfilled increasingly in our own time. “Globalism” and a “new world order” is being heralded by the USA and its allies as the hope of mankind, and is being overtly propagated as the “natural development of capitalism” by books written by corporate advisers. People of differing national, cultural and ethnic backgrounds are becoming interchangeable economic units, an undifferentiated mass of producers and consumers. Banking and industrial corporations spanning the world transcend all such differences. The result is the emergence of an international economic system that can bypass national governments. A global consumer culture emerges from the boardrooms of advertising agencies transcending ethnic and national cultures that are hindrances to international mass marketing. What will arise is a new form of internationalised, rootless humanity: we might call Homo Economicus.

Of course what triumphed was not communism, but libertarianism. The plutocrats knew how to play their own dialectical game, and in many instances used the communists in the manner Marx imagined communism would utilise free trade in a dialectical process. Communism and free trade subverted the organic bonds of nationhood, nationality, and family. The communist bloc imploded in a mountain of bankers’ debt. Upon its ruins libertarianism marches largely unchallenged.

If the forces of tradition wish to reclaim anything of value in the world beyond that which reduces life to an economic tread mill, then it ill behoves the champions of traditional values to get hoodwinked into believing they are served by libertarianism. It can be argued that ACT, Libertarianz and the free trade doctrinaires who infest the Labour and National parties do not fundamentally represent anything other than unfettered money making for the benefit of a few predators and parasites in a Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest”.

FOOTNOTE:

*Socialist movements in the pay of big capital.

This seeming paradox has been remarked upon by a number of well placed observers, among the earliest being officers and diplomats in the service of the Czar, whose intelligence network was aware of the nexus between certain plutocrats and Russian revolutionary movements.

Of recent sources, one of the most eminent was Professor Quigley, of the Foreign Service School, Georgetown University, also of Harvard and Princeton. His importance is not so much as an eminent historian and government adviser, but that he himself, as he states it, was close to the agencies of what he described as an “international network” of plutocrats. In his magnum opus Tragedy & Hope (Macmillan, 1966) Quigley describes the workings of this “network” and alludes to it as having “no aversion to co-operating with communists, or any other groups, and frequently does so.”

Plutocrats have funded all shades of socialism, from Fabianism to communism. For example, the Fabian Society established the London School of Economics, with funds from the British branch of the Rothschild dynasty, Sir Julius Wernher, and Sir Ernest Cassel, an influential banker associated with the New York bankers Kuhn, Loeb & Co. This was related by Fabian leader Beatrice Webb in her autobiography, Our Partnership.

The head of Kuhn, Loeb & co. around his time was Jacob Schiff who had a large part to play in financing socialism. The NY Times of 24 March 1917 reported that at a meeting of US revolutionaries celebrating the victory of the first (March) Kerensky Revolution in Russia, a congratulatory telegram was read from Jacob Schiff.

At the time of the March revolution most of the Communist leaders were in exile, Lenin in Switzerland, Trotsky in the USA. Trotsky was able to return to Russia courtesy of the US State department. He left the USA for Russia aboard the SS Kristianiafjord in the company of a large number of fellow revolutionaries and Wall Street businessmen, according to Dr Antony Sutton, research fellow at the Hoover Institute, who has documented the relationship between Communists and plutocrats in Wall Street & the Bolshevik Revolution (Arlington House, 1974).

At the time Russia was still in the war against Germany. The Bolshevik policy was one of separate peace with Germany. Not surprisingly, the Canadians detained Trotsky at Nova Scotia. Lt Col J B MacLean, publisher of MacLean’s Magazine, himself having had a long association with Canadian army intelligence, commented that Trotsky was released, “at the request of the British Embassy in Washington, which acted on the request of the US State Dept., who were acting for someone else.”

With the triumph of communism in Russia, the American business establishment was quick to urge US recognition of the regime. In a letter to Pres. Wilson, for example, William Sanders, chairman of Ingersoll-Rand Corp. a director of the Morgan American International Corp. and deputy chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, stated (17 Oct 1918): “I am in sympathy with the Soviet form of government as best suited for the Russian people.” The Red Cross Mission to Russia was utilised as a cover by the American business establishment. .

The mission was funded by International Harvester, according to Sutton. The mission’s director was William Thompson , director of the NY Federal Reserve. Sutton states that the majority of the mission comprised lawyers, financiers and their assistants, rather than people from the medical profession.

According to the Washington Post (2 Feb 1918) Thompson gave the Bolsheviks a personal contribution of $1 million for the spreading of propaganda in Germany and Austria. He stated to the media that the Bolshevik cause had been misunderstood. Sutton states that Thompson joined up with Thomas Lamont of J P Morgan and went to London to persuade the British War Cabinet to halt its anti-Bolshevik policy. Thompson then toured the USA campaigning for US recognition of the Soviets.

From Europe the principal channel of funds to the Bolsheviks was Olof Aschberg, of Nya Banken, Stockholm. A message from the US Embassy in Norway, 21 Feb 1918 states that “Bolshevik funds are being deposited in Nya Banken.” In 1922, when the USSR formed its first international bank, Ruskombank, comprised of German, Swedish, American and British bankers, it was headed by Aschberg. The London Evening Standard (6 Sept 1948) noted of Aschberg’s career when visiting Switzerland, that he was known among diplomatic circles as the “Soviet banker” who “advanced large sums of money to Lenin and Trotsky in 1917. At the time of the revolution Mr Aschberg gave Trotsky money to form and equip the first unit of the Red Army.”

The USSR and the rest of the Eastern bloc subsequently became so enmeshed with debt and reliance on Western technology that the supposed “Soviet threat” was largely a fiction, but served a useful purpose in dragooning nations into the American orbit. China has opened up to Western capital, while even North Korea has recently been forced to come to terms with capitalism as the result of a combination of famine and economic blockade.

THE BEST UNDERGROUND PRESS - CRITICAL REVIEW

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Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Man, State, Economics

by Fr. Kenneth Novak



Economics begins with the "management of the household" and deals primarily with the family. Only secondarily is it concerned with "Political Economy," that is, the relation of the family to external goods, with the wealth of the nation and how that wealth is produced, distributed, exchanged, and consumed. The modern economist holds Political Economy to be a physical or natural science with rigid laws, comparable to physics or geometry, which can be methodically studied and empirically tested. The point for these moderns is that the "natural" law which governs economic science is not normative (i.e., consisting of moral laws that govern what man ought to do in this or that situation) but it is rather analytic (i.e., based simply upon conclusions drawn from observation and analysis). But, believing that Economics works the same as gravity works is nuts. The law of gravity is a property of physical nature that cannot be denied without serious consequences. "Laws" of economics which demonstrate that the big firm "must" always swallow the small firm may seem irrefutably true in a society in which laissez faire (literally, "let people do [as they please]") is the law of the land, but the idea that I must conform to a "law" of this kind simply because this observed "swallowing phenomena" is likely to repeat itself—barring any moral, customary, or legal restraint—is nuts, too.

The "scientific" approach to Economics is based upon basic truths and observed behavior. Well and good, so far. For instance, it is not "economical" to undertake a productive activity if it consumes more wealth than it produces, or, men stranded on an island will immediately look to build shelter. Catholics often conclude, however, from considering this "scientific" aspect of Political Economy, that Economics is a science like math and chemistry are. But thinking of Economics only in this way leads Catholics to forget that Economics is governed by laws of justice and morality. No Catholic who understands Economics in a Catholic way would say selling pornography is an "economically valuable" activity any more than it was a moral one, or that just because America can be efficiently stocked with slave-produced Chinese junk (49 hours a week at 30-40 cents an hour), it is therefore "economical" that Wal-Mart be allowed to run every family retail and craft shop out of business.

Modern economists come to their "economic" conclusions by saying that they are "compelled" by "economic law" to argue for this and that proposition. Hilaire Belloc says that if Economics as a science is truly independent of morality, it cannot propose certain courses of action but only explain how the economic process works.

The Science of Economics does not deal with true happiness nor even with well-being in material things. It deals with a strictly limited field of what is called "Economic Wealth," and if it goes outside its own boundaries it goes wrong. Making people as happy as possible is much more than Economics can pretend to. Economics cannot even tell you how to make people well-to-do in material things. -Economics for Helen


Belloc writes that "economic law" provides no excuse for violation of the moral law, because though the two are independent one is subordinate to the other. Economics must be kept in its place in order to prevent its trumping the moral law:

The only difficulty is to keep in our minds a clear distinction between what is called economic law, that is, the necessary results of producing wealth, and the moral law, that is the matter of right and wrong in the distribution and use of wealth. Some people are so shocked by the fact that economic law is different from moral law that they try to deny economic law. Others are so annoyed by this lack of logic that they fall into the other error of thinking that economic law can override moral law. (Ibid)


Laissez faire Economics is practically laissez faire morality.

Moral philosophy is a "science" no less scientific than the next. Modern Catholics tend to think, however, of "science" as based upon natural observation and physical fact, and some other discipline as telling us how to behave. On the contrary it is very "scientific" to understand, based on first principles, how normative laws governing human action regulate not only private activity but also the public pursuit of wealth.

Knowing to what degree the science of wealth creation is ultimately subordinate to moral science would help clear up the confusion perpetuated by writers—among them even traditional Catholics—who refer to Economics as an exclusively "positive science" which is a "value-neutral, scientific discipline" and not the normative one of Political Economy which regulates human conduct. Once we skate on Economics as "value-neutral," we are on thin ice. Whereas Fr. Denis Fahey explains, "As the Mystical Body of Christ was accepted by mankind…economic thought and action began to respect the jurisdiction and guidance of the Catholic Church" (The Mystical Body of Christ in the Modern World, 5), we hear a woodpile of Catholic thinkers today deliberating that Church teaching of cardinal points of doctrine on man, society, and economic life are "an indefensible extension of the prerogatives of the Church's legitimate teaching office." On the contrary, it is from moral and social philosophy itself that economics as a social science must derive its essential concepts (Fr. Heinrich Pesch, Ethics and the National Economy)! From this foundation certain principles of moral rectitude in economic practice (beyond just theft and dishonesty) can be derived that are not the less true because the Magisterium has sought to authoritatively teach them for the common good.

On "Economics," the Catholic Encyclopedia (1912) says:

The best usage of the present time is to make political economy an ethical science, that is, to make it include a discussion of what ought to be in the economic world as well as what is. This has all along been the practice of Catholic writers.


Happily it also remains the practice of writers Christopher Ferrara and Dr. Peter Chojnowski. In this issue of The Angelus, they explain why we should reject modern schools of economics which fail to take root in a truly Catholic understanding of what justly guides and limits economic thought, namely, the moral and social philosophy that is the patrimony of the Church and her scholars. Actually, let me now pass the buck to them.

©Angelus Online

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Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Catholic Whiggery: The Neo-Conservative Betrayal Of Church Social Teaching

by Dr. Peter Chojnowski



In the past 20 years or so, we have witnessed, especially here in the United States, the emergence of what some authors have termed, "Catholic Whiggery." This movement, best exemplified by such authors as Michael Novak and Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, is but an attempt at a Catholic version of the more encompassing "Neo-Conservative" movement, which has its origins with anti-Stalinist Trotskyites, who came to be considered "conservatives" during their years of opposition to Soviet Communism during the Cold War.

Led by such intellectuals as Irving Kristol, the "Neo-Cons," as they are called, embraced the "Whig Tradition," which found its modern-day expression in the social and economic writings of Friedrich von Hayek. Hayek, a Libertarian and northern European secularist, attempted to revive and promote the Whig tradition, which advances laissez-faire economics, secular democracy, and religious and cultural pluralism. This Whig tradition could be said to have its ideological origin in the writings of the defender of the English Revolution of 1688, John Locke. (This so-called "Glorious Revolution" was the which overthrew the legitimate Catholic Stuart monarch James II and placed James's Protestant daughter Mary and her Dutch husband William of Orange jointly on the British throne.)

To understand the "world vision" of these contemporary Liberals (i.e., Libertarians), we must first remember that they themselves trace their ideological origins to the 18th- century Enlightenment. Michael Novak has described the scheme of these Enlightenment theorists and political leaders as follows:

One of the great achievements of the Whig tradition was its new world experiment, the Novus Ordo Seclorum (the New Order of the Ages). Its American progenitors called that experiment the commercial republic. The Whigs were the first philosophers in history to grasp the importance of basing government of the people upon the foundation of commerce. They underpinned democracy with a capitalist, growing economy.1

That such a Liberal ideology could prevail amongst secularists and non-Catholics groping for an alternative to post-World War II Soviet Communism and Fabian Socialism is not terribly surprising. What is surprising is that such an ideological view could be defended by Catholic thinkers who, subsequently, attempt to "discover" a "Catholic Whig tradition" running back in time to St. Thomas Aquinas. That such Catholic Whigs are claiming to base their circumvention of the entire Catholic Social Teaching on the "Whiggery" of certain "late Spanish Scholastics" is well known. Novak himself attempts to make the Angelic Doctor a precursor of this "tradition" by claiming that St. Thomas's belief in "ordered liberty," mixed government (i.e., several different bodies of the State exercising the various powers of Sovereignty and serving as a hindrance to the emergence of tyranny), and his belief in man's powers of "reflection and choice," puts him firmly in the camp of Democratic Capitalism. The untenable nature of this claim, especially in light of St. Thomas's condemnation of usury, his understanding of the common good, and his unequivocal position that monarchy is the best form of human government, causes Novak, in various places in his writings, to rely on the more standard Whig philosophers like John Locke and Adam Smith to ground his ideological defense of democratic capitalism, American-style. His laudatory rhetoric in praise of these thinkers and the System they spawned often descends to the level of the blasphemous and the absurd. In an article entitled, "A Theology of the Corporation," Novak cites the memorable and moving last words of the young Abbe d'Ambricourt, "Grace is everywhere," to offer "signs of grace in the [multinational] corporation." In this regard, Novak finds seven such "signs," which he states is a "suitably sacramental number."2

In an appendix to this same article, Novak acknowledges that the Capitalist Idea, which is part and parcel of the Whig ideology, owes its origins to the Enlightenment thinkers Locke, Montesquieu, and Adam Smith, and the "economic development," which they uniquely initiated, was brought about first with the "white race and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and, indeed, of a few philosophers."3

We can fully understand the inflated claims of this advocate of the enlightened Liberal New Age, when we read that, "The notion that poverty could be diminished was born with John Locke and Adam Smith."4

Those who were against these "few" enlightened, poverty-hating thinkers were "many Continental philosophers and theologians-Latins, Germans, Slavs-[who] opposed 'Manchester liberalism' all through the 19th century, disliking it intensely."5

What is heartening for those who seek to uphold the Catholic Church's Social Teachings against this new Capitalist Messianism of the Catholic Whig is Novak's dismissal of those social teachings with his statement that, "The papal encyclicals treat it [meaning Liberal Capitalist theory] as a Protestant heresy."6

What is at the core of this Liberal ideological view, shared in full by the "Catholic Whigs" of our own time, are the ideas of social, political, religious, and economic individualism and the subsequent non-interventionism of the State. It was the task of John Locke to philosophically ground this Whiggish Liberal world-view, while it fell to Montesquieu to formulate the exact nature of the Liberal Commercial Republic of the post-Enlightenment period. The descriptive part was easy. Montesquieu understood the Liberal regime to be a union of fellow citizens, bound together, not so much by ties of friendship, as by contract. This alliance of contracting parties was intent upon maximizing their freedom of choice through a confederation of convenience. In such a socio-political order, men found themselves cut off from one another or, at best, linked through a market mechanism. What would happen if this Liberal Republic was realized, would be a world in which everything had its price and, accordingly, its sellers and buyers. A marketplace of arms' length transactions would replace political community.

As we can surmise, religion is of no importance in such a commercial republic. This is why Locke restricts religion to the private sphere. Couldn't we say that it is exactly this restriction that distinguishes the Liberal regime from the regimes of Old Europe? This Whig view, which understands government to be constituted by contracting individuals and whose sole purpose is to insure the execution of the contracts made between individuals, cannot but alter Christendom's understanding of what the purpose of civil society is. In his first Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues for the civic toleration of all religions (except the intolerable anti-liberal Catholic one) by making the following claim about the nature of civil society itself:

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

Locke is even more explicit as regards his understanding of a Liberal political order when he states, in his Second Treatise on Government, that,

The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

Any idea of a common end of all the members of society and of society as a whole is completely lacking in this political view. The religion of the people, along with their growth in the virtues of faith, hope, and charity are certainly not the concern of the rulers of such a Liberal State. As Locke states in the same text,

If a heathen doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magistrate and the estates of the people may be equally secure whether any man believe these things or no. I readily grant that these opinions are false and absurd. But the business of the laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man's goods and person.

According to this analysis, then, government is only delegated the task of guaranteeing the private relationships and agreements initiated by the individual citizens themselves. Society does not have a corporate task, responsibility, or goal. Any goal which transcends the one of material acquisition and psychophysical contentment is considered beyond the legitimate realm of State interest and concern. "Providing the conditions necessary for the advancement in virtue and the ultimate attainment of Heaven" is out. Christendom is nullified. The past, made up of completely non-Liberal societies, is to be initially vilified and then forgotten. All the Whig theorists advance this same goal, whether Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Lord Acton, or Michael Novak. Indeed, this rejection of the idea of socially and economically significant State intervention in the affairs of the commonweal is the very essence of the ideology of the Whigs, whether neo-Catholic or non-Catholic. Novak himself states this when he writes,

The foundational concept of democratic capitalism, then, is not, as Marx thought, private property [which it would be, of course, for Distributism]. It is limited government. Private property, of course, is one limitation on government. What is interesting about private property is not that I own something, that I possess; its heart is not 'possessive individualism'....Quite the opposite. The key is that the state is limited by being forbidden to control all rights and all goods.7

What is little realized by those who attempt to stand up to the steam roller of Whiggery, whether in its Catholic or non-Catholic versions, is the fact that Locke constructed an entire theory of human knowledge for the express purpose of bolstering the Whig theory of government and society. This theory is called "empiricism" and has shaped the minds of most men in the Anglo-American world since that time. It can be understood as the theoretical foundation of all the Liberal claims about man and the world of men. Fundamentally, this theory claims that human knowledge is limited to the external appearances of things in the world. The very "substantial being" of things, the essence of created things and structures in the natural world, cannot be known by the human mind. Substance, according to Locke, is "I know not what." The importance of this basic philosophical stand cannot be overerestimated. If man, and, more importantly, the embodiment of the society of men, the State, cannot know the "what" of things, he certainly cannot know the "why" of things. Locke allowed that individual men could know the "why" of things by blind faith alone. The State, however, has not the authorization or the competence to speculate as to the "why" of things. Therefore, any theological or philosophical teachings that answer the question "why" are strictly beyond the pale of acceptable political discourse. The State is simply relegated to keeping the individual citizens, who come up with their own private "whys," off each other's back and, most importantly, out of each others wallets!


Dr. Peter E. Chojnowski has an undergraduate degree in Political Science and another in Philosophy from Christendom College. He also received his master's degree and doctorate in Philosophy from Fordham University. He and his wife, Kathleen are the parents of five children. He teaches for the Society of Saint Pius X at Immaculate Conception Academy, Post Falls, ID.




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Taken from Thomas Storck, "The Social Order as Community" in Caelum et Terra, Fall 1996.

2. Michael Novak, "A Theology of the Corporation," in The Corporation: A Theological Inquiry (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Reseach, 1981), pp.206-207.

3. Ibid.,p.225.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 209. Cf. For a complementary view, see Paul Johnson, "Is There a Moral Basis for Capitalism?" in Democracy and Mediating Structures: A Theological Inquiry, ed. Michael Novak (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp.49-58.

©Dr. Peter Chojnowski

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Tuesday, January 30, 2007

The Seven Principles of the New Radicalism

by F.R. Hoare



When Karl Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto in 1848, he pointed out the problems of capitalism and its disastrous effect on society. Marx correctly stated that capitalism was destroying family, property, and Faith. Catholics share, to a degree, Marx’s criticism of capitalism as Hilaire Belloc explains in The Servile State. Capitalism makes the individual the primary economic unit, rather than the family. Work outside the home, first the father and children and then the mother, pulls apart the family unit just as family work on the farm and in the workshop hold it together. Capitalism is the enemy of private property because unfettered competition takes property out of the hands of the many and concentrates it in the hands of the few. (How many small businesses in rural towns can long survive the arrival of Sam Walton’s Wal/Hyper-Mart?) Capitalism is the enemy of the Faith because it requires an atmosphere that excludes moral considerations from economics in order to pave the way for the unfettered reign of “market forces.” The disaster that follows is left to the charity of others (thousand points of light?) with no consideration to the injustices that caused the disaster.

“Liberal” comes from the Latin word liber, which means “frees” individuals and societies from the teachings of Christ and His Church. It “frees” from the truth of Christ that truly sets one free (cf. Jn. 8:32). It appears to be freedom, but it is slavery. Capitalism is simply economic liberalism. It seeks to free the economic life of society from the moral constraints of the Gospel. It is amoral economics and therefore Godless and atheistic economics.

Although Catholics partially share Marx’s critique of capitalism, there are a few big differences. And for our purpose here, this difference is key: Marx saw capitalism as temporarily useful because it was destroying the Christian society built by the Church during the Age of Faith. In turn, Marx foresaw socialism fulfilling its “historical destiny” by destroying capitalism to finish what it had begun. Catholics do not see this process as good, but as bad. We do not want property in fewer and fewer hands, but in more and more hands we have Catholic social principles to guide us in this restoration. It is important for us to remember that Catholic social principles are not pie-in-the-sky dreaming. We can say that for sure, as Catholic civilization has existed as an historical fact. It is now largely destroyed, but it was a reality for centuries, far from perfect, but a reality nonetheless.

In the following article, F.R. Hoare gives us seven principles to put our economic system back on the Catholic hinges that it was taken off of several centuries ago. These principles are called "radical" because they get to the root of the problem (the Latin word for root is radix). These principles would help to convert amoral capitalist economics to moral Catholic economics. Some of these principles are a bit deep and you will need to think, but the most important are simple:

1) The existence of God should be made the starting point of economic reasoning" and

2) The fundamental laws of economics are moral laws; Our Lord Jesus Christ said it a little differently, "But seek first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be given you besides" (Mt. 6:33).

It has become a matter of urgency to cease arguing about the extent to which economic science need take morals or religion into consideration. In present circumstances we need nothing less than an economics that is itself a system of morals in its basic principles.

At one time it was an accepted thing that economics was a more or less mathematical science, into which morals could only enter as a disturbing element. Even the philanthropists asked no more than that moral considerations should occasionally be allowed to temper the practical conclusions drawn by scientific analysis. Unhappily, practical experience showed that economic processes, and the men who worked them, having once been set in motion without regard to morals, did not easily admit the introduction of morals at a later stage.

Even those who by their religious profession acknowledged that morals should come first were generally willing to agree that the case of economics was "somehow different." They did this even when they had a sound system of moral philosophy to draw on. As for those who had no sound philosophy behind them, but only amiable intentions, their attempt to regulate economics by morals was foredoomed to failure. For they proposed to substitute for non-moral economics, not a system of economic justice, but selections from the Sermon on the Mount. Many of these selections, however, were not originally intended as rules of justice but as counsels to those who would attain Christian perfection by going beyond economic justice and rising spiritually superior to economic injustice. Consequently they do not provide a basis for a system of economics.

By contrast with these feeble or misdirected attempts to put economics on an ethical basis, the Russian Revolution came to many as an inspiration. For the economic theories of Karl Marx, though closely related on the technical side to those of his contemporaries, introduced into their formulas certain violent moral judgments (concerning, for example, the dis. possessing and exploitation of "the workers") which turned their practical application upside down and gave what has been called a "Messianic" flavor to his own vision of the future of the working class. This appeal to something like a religious emotion in economics was strengthened by Marx's elimination of any kind of supernatural religion from his system and his elevation of economics to be itself the key to all history and the measure of all values.

When, therefore, his principles seemed to be visibly embodied in a Socialist Republic in Russia at a moment of world-wide physical and moral confusion, an enthusiasm for them was generated that had something of the character of a religious revival, with the USSR for a Church. In little more than a decade from this Revolution Marx's hitherto comparatively neglected dogmas had established themselves over the greater part of the globe as a goad for the masses and an opiate for the intellectuals.

Now, in so far as it really brought back to the world a desire for economic justice and for bettering the lot of the dispossessed, and led the way in giving effect to this desire, Marxist Communism did a good and much-needed work. But in so far as it conceived of economic justice wholly in terms of a single class, even though the largest-indeed, in so far as it thought in terms of classes of any kind, to the exclusion of the individual and families-it could never give the world a universally satisfying justice or one founded on the true needs of human nature. And in so far as it made economic betterment an end in itself, and taught that all the values of human life could be realized by an economic change, it made economic betterment worthless and human life a mockery. For in so doing it cut men off from God, Who alone can give life its final meaning.

Since, therefore, this exclusively class outlook, with its corollary of class hatred, and this materialism, with its corollary of militant atheism, are fundamental tenet of Marxist Communism, the restoration of an ethical outlook in economics by its agency has been, on the balance, not a gain to the world, but an unparalleled disaster. It calls, moreover, for action to counter it, which, to be effective, must also be on the moral plane, and at least as radical.

This need was recognized by the political opponents of Bolshevism. Mussolini and Hitler each in his own way met the Marxist challenge by an economics based on a kind of counter-morality. Mussolini borrowed some of the leading ideas of Catholic sociology and tried to combine them with something like a pagan worship of the State. Hitler's appeal was wholly pagan, and based economics, like politics, on a kind of religious worship of the German race; and he sought to enforce his system on so-called inferior races with as fanatical a cruelty as the Bolsheviks used in enforcing theirs upon so-called class enemies.

During the same period, Catholic statesmen in a number of countries made beginnings in reconstruction on the basis of traditional morality that at least bore witness to a growing sense of the need of meeting a moral revolution in economics with a moral counterrevolution.

If this need existed before the renewal of the Great War, it was intensified beyond all measure after it. The Nazi pact with the USSR showed that the political opposition between the two systems counted for less than the common bond of godlessness and in-humanity linking their moral codes.

Thus, when the sheer destructiveness of the war itself came, making it certain that drastic economic and social reconstruction must be undertaken in Western Europe, it had become certain also that nothing short of a completely radical reconstruction on the basis of absolute morality could hold its own against the Bolshevik economic creed.

THE PURPOSE OF THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES

When we speak of economic reconstruction on a moral basis it is not meant that the whole of economics can be comprised in a moral code. The view of economics as a non-moral, quasi-mathematical science contains this much truth: that a great part of it must always consist of technical description and analysis, since it has to determine what economic aims are technically practicable and what are the most efficient methods of attaining them.

But the subject matter of economics is, after all, a field of human activity, namely man's efforts to supply his material needs. Its material aims, therefore, must ultimately be judged by their conformity to the moral ends of human life, and its methods by the moral standards of human conduct.

We must start, therefore, from certain truths of natural religion and morality, which, for our present purposes, must be assumed without argument. Thus, we assume the existence of an all-good God, Whom it is our highest work to serve. We assume that men are free agents in all their deliberate acts, and responsible for them to their conscience and to God. We assume also that the nature of man, like that of every other living thing, is built to follow a definite pattern of behavior and cannot fully realize its possibilities unless it does follow it; and, further, that in the case of man, owing to his moral freedom, this behavior pattern consists, not only of physical and mental laws, but also of moral laws, that is to say, of laws binding, not by physical compulsion, but by moral obligation.

Finally, we assume that the moral powers of man (generally called his virtues), by which he is enabled to fulfill these moral laws, conform to the same general pattern in all men (just as his physical powers do), though they may vary in strength from individual to individual as the result of heredity, training, and use or misuse. Thus, one man may be courageous by nature, another courageous chiefly by training or self-discipline; some men grow up honest but lose the habit of honesty by giving way to the temptations of a particular position; but all men have in them at least the rudiments of courage, honesty and the rest.

These are unchanging facts of the spiritual order. Between them and the technical problems of economics there lies a gap, and the seven principles set out in this outline are intended to bridge it. It will be well, before explaining them one by one, to give the complete list of them without comment.

1) The existence of God should be made the starting point of economic reasoning.

2) The fundamental laws of economics are moral laws.

3) The essential moral rights and duties of man spring from his own nature and not from the State.

4) Economic justice will be best attained (other things being equal) in an economic system resting upon independent individual status.

5) The pattern of life of an economic community is best regulated if the State is built up of spontaneous and self-governing groups each fulfilling a distinctive economic function.

6) An economic system serves real needs best when its objectives are conceived in terms of goods and services rather than of money.

7) The natural needs of men and women as producers and consumers, and not the potentialities of mechanization, monetary technique and salesmanship, are the proper measure of both production and consumption.


God, the Moral Law, The State, and the Individual in Economics


We must now proceed to explain and comment briefly on each of these seven principles in turn, beginning with the first:

1. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD SHOULD BE MADE THE STARTING POINT OF ECONOMIC REASONING.

It is not enough, for the purpose of economic thought and controversy, that God's existence should be believed and that He should be the object of religion. It is necessary to make it clear that His existence bears directly upon the solution of economic problems and to show how it does so.

This working-out of theism in the field of economics and sociology is related to simple theism much as what may be called the sociological atheism of Marxist Communism is related to the atheism of the continental Liberalism that descends from the French Revolution.

That atheism is often complete enough in the theological sphere but stops short at the application of its principles to economic and social life. It professes, indeed, to found its political and economic system on natural liberty and the rights of man without reference to God, but its very appeal to natural liberty and rights is a survival of Catholic philosophy. Indeed, it was this retention of these ideals cut off (by atheism) from their logical basis and their limiting principles that was responsible for the economic lawlessness of the Liberal era. Marx had an easy task in pointing out the license and exploitation that followed in the train of this inconsistent individualism and, with better logic, constructed a new philosophy of human society based from the beginning upon atheistic premises, complete with economic determinism and the absolute subordination of the individual to the class or the community.

Somewhat similarly, the theists of the 19th century stopped short at applying their principles to the economic system except as a kind of afterthought which could do little more than expose them to ridicule. Marxism must be met by a theism that permeates the whole of our economic thinking and by an economies that is theistic from the outset.

The second of our principles is:

2. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF ECONOMICS ARE MORAL LAWS.

This principle follows from the fact that men remain morally responsible for their deliberate acts in all circumstances, including their economic relations.

In the Middle Ages economists had no doubt that economics was, at bottom, the science of how men ought to behave to one another in the course of getting a living. Hence they dealt primarily with men and their behavior, and only secondarily with goods and money and their accumulation. They emphasized the sinfulness of avarice and of taking advantage of another's urgent necessities; they held that the craftsman was under a moral obligation to do good work; they required that wages, prices, and rates of interest should be just and not merely competitive; and so forth. They rightly considered that to disregard these principles was bad economics.

In the second half of the 18th century economists began to teach openly that each man should pursue solely his economic self-interest. They tried to bring this into a system of morals by declaring that the economic uniformities resulting from this simplification of motives constituted a natural harmony; but the practical effect of their doctrine was to put economics into a separate compartment of life, outside morals, ruled by jungle law under slogans like "business is business."

In the next phase of Liberalism the economic uniformities in question came to be regarded as inexorable laws of nature against which rebellion was as futile as against the law of gravitation. This determinism was used to prevent philanthropists from trying to mitigate the system. Marx gave a fresh turn to it by representing the existing economic system, and all economic change, as brought about entirely by a predetermined historical process.

Our second principle cuts at the root of all these heresies. So far from admitting that moral considerations constitute a deviation from the strict path of economic truth, it implies that maladjustments even on the strictly economic plane may be traceable to moral error.

The third principle follows closely upon the second:

3. THE ESSENTIAL MORAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN SPRING FROM HIS OWN NATURE AND NOT FROM THE STATE.

The significance of this lies in the fact that human nature was made by God, so that the essential moral rights and duties of men have an absolute claim upon them. The State can in no way release men from this claim, which it did nothing to create.

The State can create secondary and purely political rights and duties, such as the right to an old-age pension or the duty to keep to the left when driving on the road; and, if these secondary rights and duties are consistent with the eternal moral law and the general moral purpose for which the State exists, they have a certain moral validity so long as the State upholds them. Furthermore, the very existence of men in a Political community gives a fresh turn to the way in which the rights and obligations of the eternal moral law fall upon individuals. Thus, the right and duty of a man to restrain someone who is threatening him or his neighbors, and to bring home to him the dictates of the moral law, may eventually fall upon a prison governor who was not directly threatened by the original violence.

But these alterations in what is called the incidence of the moral law do not constitute alterations in the moral law itself; and, if they were stretched so as to amount to violations of it, the fact that the State ordered them would not make them moral or legitimate. The fundamental moral rights and duties of men, so far from being alterable by the State, are the standard by which all secondary and political rights and duties, and all fresh applications of the fundamental ones, must be judged.

The fundamental ones include:

(a) The duty of self-preservation and self-maintenance at the level of human decency, and the right of access to the means of carrying this out.

(b) The right and duty of parents to rear children in a way befitting responsible creatures and (normally) in the family circle, and the right of access to the means to this end also.

(c) The duty of maintaining justice and charity in all relations with fellow men, not excluding industrial and business relations, and the right (in a political community) to the protection of the law in fulfilling this duty.

(d) The right to scope in economic life for self development, both natural and spiritual.

All these rights and duties bear directly upon economics, because they require that the economic system should provide securities and opportunities fog certain ways of living based upon them.

The fourth principle asserts that:

4. ECONOMIC JUSTICE WILL BE BEST ATTAINED OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL) IN AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM RESTING UPON INDEPENDENT INDIVIDUAL STATUS.

The essence of status is the secure tenure of a position, in the present context, of an economic position. By contrast with status, the security given by a contract, besides being temporary, may be nullified by the fact that, while one of the parties to it was in a position of economic security when he made it, the other was not, so that he made it under economic constraint and had to accept unjust terms. A person in possession of some permanent economic security is in a position to insist upon the recognition of his moral rights in any bargain he makes.

Moreover, if his status takes the form of ownership of means of production, he will be to that extent less dependent upon bargaining, or upon other persons or the State, or upon external circumstances of any kind, and under less pressure to violate his conscience in his working life. In addition, he will have more opportunities for using his working life constructively for his moral development. The maximum degree of economic self-sufficiency and stability is given by tenure of land by a family which cultivates it so as to supply their primary material needs.

It is not necessary for these purposes that the tenure should be full ownership. They were served by (for example) the land tenures of the Middle Ages, even in the case of the serf, who, though obliged to remain on his plot of land and render services for it, could not be deprived of the occupation and use of it. They can be fulfilled to some extent even in a large 20th century industrial unit if each worker has a real share in the ownership and control, though he cannot dispose of any part of the plant himself.

Indeed, absolute ownership, accompanied by the right of unlimited accumulation, may militate against the moral purposes for which property rights exist. It may weaken the owner's sense of the obligations attaching to property and at the same time enable him to override the property rights of others. The purposes of property are as a rule best fulfilled, and least likely to be violated, if there is a wide distribution of property proportioned to function; that is to say, if the head of each family holds or has assured access to what he and his family can personally use in winning their livelihood. In this way property becomes the security for each man's moral rights in the economic order and the basis for a true industrial democracy and neighborly charity.

The opposite effect is produced when each individual's economic status depends directly upon the State. The State is necessary in order to protect the property that gives the citizen status, but its own guarantee of status is not an adequate substitute for that property. It is more likely to reduce the citizens to a condition of servitude to the State.

The Structure and Aims of an Economic System

The fifth of our principles relates individual status to the organization of a Political and economic society:

5. THE PATTERN OF LIFE OF AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY IS BEST REGULATED IF THE STATE IS BUILT UP OF SPONTANEOUS GROUPS EACH FULFILLING A DISTINCTIVE ECONOMIC FUNCTION.

In communities in which most citizens have a reasonably assured economic status, their natural sense of justice and their instinct for social conduct will go a long way to ensure the observance of moral rights and duties in the pattern of community life, at least in very small and simple communities. But the size of most States of recent times makes the citizens so remote from one another in every sense, and makes their economic relations so indirect and complicated, that they lose the sense of how to shape their conduct towards one another.

The Liberalism of the nineteenth century tended to leave men to pursue their individual interests with the minimum of policing or moral guidance, on the theory that this would in the long run conduce to moral and economic harmony. Actually it brought about moral and economic anarchy. In the reaction against Liberalism the State tends to fill the void by planning in detail the social and economic relations of its citizens and, in the moral sphere, by extending its authority so as to override the moral rights of the individual by a moral code of its own.

It is practically impossible, in a large State, to avoid falling into one or other of these extremes unless intermediate groups are introduced, standing between the individual and the State. Each group needs to be composed of individuals having real contact and common interests with one another and collectively fulfilling a distinctive function in the community. All those concerned in a single industry or profession, such as agriculture or engineering or teaching, form such a group, and all the groups together should represent all the major economic activities of the community.

In this way the internal arrangements and practices of each industry are controlled, both in their technical and in their moral aspects, by those immediately concerned, and by all sections of them acting together; while its relations with other industries and with the community as a whole are regulated by the common council of the State in which all the groups take part. It is essential, however, that the groups (or "corporations" as they are commonly called now) should as far as possible come into existence spontaneously and have real lives of their own; otherwise they are little more than agents for an all-powerful central government, as they became in Fascist Italy.

The sixth principle is as follows:

6. AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM SERVES REAL NEEDS BEST WHEN ITS OBJECTIVES ARE CONCEIVED IN TERMS OF GOODS AND SERVICES RATHER THAN OF MONEY.

Goods and services must in any case be the real foundation of even the most elaborate monetary economy, which cannot in the long run command confidence unless they exist to back it. But this fact is not sufficient to prevent men from going very far astray from realities, both moral and material, as a result of thinking primarily in terms of money. For example, under a monetary economy the phrase "a favorable balance of trade" describes a state of affairs when more goods are leaving the country than entering it. Or again, millions of needy men, whose country possesses natural resources amply sufficient, with their labor to supply their needs, are allowed to rot in idleness because no monetary profit can be expected from setting them to work.

Money is certainly necessary in all but the very simplest economic communities in order to bridge gaps between the production of goods and the satisfaction of wants. For example, when a workman does not produce the goods he himself needs, or has no control over what he produces, he must be remunerated by wages, so as to buy elsewhere. Similarly, when the productive activity of a factory has to begin long before the products can be marketed, the owner needs money, either saved or borrowed, to pay wages in the meantime.

This is all very well, but there is a tendency to stereotype these gaps and make them appear part of the order of nature. Thus, the wage system seems to give sanction to the separation of men from both the tools and the fruit of their labor, making their labor an article for sale rather than an activity with a purpose. Similarly, international trade, instead of being a supplementary device whereby countries obtain comforts and luxuries which they cannot produce for themselves, becomes an institution for the sake of which nations are deliberately specialized until they become incapable of supplying themselves even with necessities.

Furthermore, money is treated, not only as an instrument for the exchange of commodities, but as if it were itself a commodity to be dealt in for profit. This is a constant cause of profit-making that is intrinsically immoral (for money is not a commodity of this kind). In addition, it creates new vested interests in perpetuating and exaggerating those gaps which must be bridged by money.

Practically every operation in industry comes to be financed by loans, so that it is burdened by the interest upon them and liable to be dislocated by organized gambling on the prospects of a profitable return on them. Even the money used in these transactions comes into existence as debt on which interest must be paid wherever it circulates. A class is called into existence whose sole business is to exploit the dependence of the system upon money, and which claims the right to create money for that purpose. And, since money permeates the system at every point, it wields a power often greater than the State's.

Finally, money, thus made the touchstone of every transaction, has every moral disqualification for this role. It is wholly undiscriminating. One hundred pounds is one hundred pounds whether it is the profit on good work or on fakes, on necessities or on luxuries, on goods that meet a demand or on goods for which an artificial demand has to be created. It has no natural limits, upwards or downwards, such as define (for example) the amount of land a family can cultivate effectively; so that it affords the maximum of opportunity for the unequal distribution of wealth. And these very characteristics, together with its efficiency as an instrument of power, give it an unequalled hold as an object of avarice.

The seventh principle safeguards certain needs of man's nature which economic activity exists to serve but which are liable to be overlooked amid the triumphs of economic technique. It runs:

7. THE NATURAL NEEDS OF MEN AND WOMEN AS PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS, AND NOT THE POTENTIALITIES OF MECHANIZATION, MONETARY TECHNIQUE AND SALESMANSHIP, ARE THE PROPER MEASURE OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION.

The purpose of production is consumption, and until recently there was no question, except for a tiny fraction of mankind, of production exceeding man's natural needs as a consumer. Man's power of producing commodities did not exceed his capacity for consuming them profitably, and commonly fell far below it. The use of mechanical power and, still more recently, of mechanized mass-production has enormously increased man's capacity for producing commodities without making any corresponding increase in his capacity for consuming them.

There is, of course, a sense in which a man's capacity for the consumption of goods is almost unlimited. He can make some kind of use of yachts, cars, mansions, grouse-moors and so on. But if we are speaking of a standard of living that is to be widely distributed, then the amount that any one person can consume with enjoyment in the course of his life has comparatively narrow physical limits. Finally, if we take it into account, as we should, those elements in human nature which cannot be satisfied by material goods and are stifled by the over-consumption of them, we arrive at quite definite natural standards, which vary with individuals and classes but are discoverable by each man for himself and which wise men make it part of their business in life to discover. Consuming capacity, therefore, has lagged behind producing capacity, and this has caused production to become largely speculative and to depend to an increasing degree upon the creation of an artificial demand by advertisement and salesmanship. Monetary technique has also been used to expand demand artificially, and the use of it has been seized upon, not only by businessmen seeking profit, but by propagandists preaching increased consumption as an ideal.

This creation of an artificial demand, besides being responsible for great financial disorders, has been disastrous morally. It puts the means before the end and, in serving the means, of necessity inverts the true scale of values; for the means are mass-production, which by its nature puts quantity before quality and the material before the spiritual.

Moreover, the process violates man's nature, not only as a consumer, but also as a producer. Machines are not in themselves either good or bad, and some can be made to serve the higher needs of those who use them. But mechanization, or the general employment of mechanical methods to eliminate the human element in production, inevitably tends to frustrate the very purpose for which it is advocated.

It eliminates craftsmanship (except for a very small minority of technicians) and eliminates also the small units in industry, with the scope they give for personal qualities. Furthermore, it inflicts direct injury on those whom it employs, by requiring them to work as automatons under great nervous strain, and by exacting a servile discipline in the factories, where men are herded and treated in the mass.

Commentary on the Seven Principles as the Basis of an Economic System

The seven principles formulated and briefly explained in the foregoing outline, form, when taken together, a connected whole, linking the fixed realities of the spiritual world and of human nature to economics in such a way as to provide the basis for a complete economic system.

The first principle puts the whole subject matter of economics in its true perspective by displaying the pursuit of material well-being, not as an end in itself, but as an instrument in the service of God. Regarded as an end in itself the pursuit of material well-being cannot do other than drag men down to a merely material level. Regarded as an instrument for God's service it acquires dignity and an eternal value even in its merely technical devices.

The second principle sets up again for the guidance of economists those moral signposts which Adam Smith classed with superstitions concerning witchcraft, but which did in fact save the medieval economists from the confusions and chaos of later economic science. It requires us to reintroduce boldly into economic discussions the ethical precepts condemning (for example) injustice in wage-fixing, extortion by monopolies, and the whole practice of usury. It forbids us to be intimidated by so-called economic laws which purport to have the inflexible character of the laws of mechanics but in fact depend on assumptions concerning human nature that beg the whole question.

These so-called laws beg the question because they assume, not only that men will naturally act in economic life from the single motive of avarice, but also that they will be left to do so without remonstrance from either Church or governments. But our second principle asserts that there can be no sound economic life unless the Church teaches, and governments enforce, the moral law even in the economic sphere, leaving the equations of the economists to adjust themselves to the altered standards of conduct.

The third principle tells us that the State, though the proper agent for enforcing the moral law in the political community, is not the source of the moral law and has no right to override it. Thus this principle vindicates the right of the family and the individual to enjoy certain fundamental liberties and opportunities and fulfill certain fundamental duties attaching to them as human beings before ever the State came into existence. These rights and duties include, moreover, the whole business of maintaining individual and family life at a decent material standard and economic relations with others at a decent moral standard; and this principle by implication lays upon the State the duty of protecting and fostering these activities.

The fourth principle indicates the method by which the third principle may best be put into effect, namely by ensuring to the individual, with his family, an economic status in virtue of which he can exercise his economic rights and fulfill his duties and at the same time be safeguarded against any tendency on the part of the State to exceed its proper functions. This principle requires us to examine the nature of private property and of the right to it, and also the limits to that right. In so doing it points us to the first element of a sound structure of an economic society, namely widely distributed private property, in one form or another, held under the State's protection.

The fifth principle adds a second structural element, namely the corporative organization of industry and of the State itself. This form of organization, like individual status, is both an aid to applying the moral law in economic life and a method of economic construction. In the former capacity it provides a channel for those moral instincts that operate especially through social and collective action. As a method of economic construction it is particularly designed to secure an adjustment of interests and willing cooperation between the various grades of participants in each industry (operatives, management, directorate and investing public), between the different industries, between the banks and industry, and between producers and consumers.

It is, therefore, doubly qualified for giving concrete expression, adjusted to the economic realities of the moment, to the conception of justice in the matter of rents, profits, interest, wages, and conditions of labor and in the operations of trusts and monopolies.

It creates also the possibility of State planning without the dangers of planning conducted solely by a centralized government. The central technical problem of a planned economy (and, indeed, of an economic system of any kind) is the adjustment of supply to demand. Closely connected with this are the problems of the adjustment of investment in producers' goods to the consumption of consumers' goods and of the stabilization of the price level to eliminate the industrial cycle. All these problems of economic interdependence are dealt with most safely by the mutually interdependent organs of the Corporative State.

The sixth principle clears away the chief technical obstacle to these adjustments of interests and this comprehensive planning, namely the habit of thinking of the economic process primarily in terms of money and bringing all economic problems to the test of monetary profit and the well-being of the money market.

That habit is an unending source of confusion and misdirection in economic life. For example, the proper status of agriculture in any particular community can never be judged aright so long as the first consideration is that invested capital should obtain a high or a speedy return. For agriculture can never render a return of that kind where acreage is restricted. Consequently, in a country like Britain, the monetary criterion will lead to dependence on imported food in order to enable foreign countries to pay interest on capital invested in them or to pay for manufactured exports.

Moreover, the whole question of the place to be accorded in the national economy to international trade is wrongly stated when it is put in terms of , monetary profit. For that depends upon local advantages in costs of production of special commodities, and tempts men to exaggerate those at the cost of the nation's general productive resources in men and soil, for the decay of which no artificially stimulated interchange of commodities can permanently compensate.

Similarly, we can tackle the elimination and prevention of large-scale unemployment constructively and directly in terms of idle labor and unused productive resources if we discard the notion, inseparable from the private creation of credit, that money applied to industry must necessarily be burdened by the requirement that it should earn the market rate of interest.

This principle points, therefore, to the control by the State of the creation and cancellation of credit by the banks, and to the assertion by the community of their ultimate authority over money in all its forms. It points also to the control of the stock market, particularly of its speculative elements, in order that its fluctuations may become merely a reflection of the state of industry and not a disturbing factor in it.

The seventh principle sets very necessary limits to the use of the monetary stimulus, or any other, to any part of the economic whole. For, just as the sixth principle subordinates money to commodities and services, so this last principle subordinates commodities and services to the human persons who are meant to benefit by them. It puts, not only monetary technique, but also advertising and salesmanship, in their proper place in relation to the consumer; and puts the use of machinery, the standardization of industrial processes, "Taylorism," and all such impersonal and depersonalizing aids to production, in their proper place in relation to the producer.

It indicates, also, the fallacy underlying the conception of the Leisure State, which is put forward as an escape from the spiritual evils of mass-consumption and mass-production. The advocates of this ideal urge that the productivity of machines should be used, not so much to multiply commodities indefinitely as to make the necessary commodities quickly, leaving everybody ample leisure. They are often willing to admit that the perfecting of a man's personality depends (once necessities are assured) on his own creative activity rather than on external things. But they claim that, when short spells of machine-minding have become the only necessary work, the men and women who have taken their turn at these will then turn spontaneously to the creative crafts of the pre-machine age.

An elementary knowledge of fallen human nature, however, and observation of existing leisured classes, combine to refute this claim. The capacity for using leisure creatively depends largely on the training that the creative powers receive in productive work that calls for their exercise. Methods of production that degrade or stifle these powers, while increasing the craving for leisure, at the same time destroy the capacity for using leisure well.

Moreover, the requisite training of the creative powers and the habit of using them can only be acquired (so far as the vast majority of mankind are concerned) under discipline; and the natural discipline for their acquisition is necessary productive work. If the training is to be enforced in leisure time upon a population with minds rendered vacant and nerves exhausted by their work as machine-tenders, the Leisure State would soon be indistinguishable from the Police State, and the leisure would be only an escape from one form of servitude to another.

By contrast with this delusive mirage, the seven principles safeguard all the essentials of human freedom at the same time as they provide a basis for an exact investigation of the technical problems of economic science.



Taken from The Catholic Mind, Vo1. XXXIX, Nov. 8, 1941, No. 933. Reprinted from The Dublin Review (July, 1941). Introduction written by Mr. Christopher McCann of Angelus Press.



The Servile State (see Introduction above) is available from Angelus Press. Price: $10.00. Explains that capitalism (liberalism applied to economics) is inherently unstable and that the two "remedies" proposed by the world (Marxist collectivism and the Servile State) are worse than the disease! Shows how capitalism tends towards its twin brother Marxism because both undermine the Catholic ideal of a broad distribution of property. The real solution: Distributism (Catholicism applied to economics).

Read more...

Thursday, January 18, 2007

Liberal Economics vs. Catholic Truth

by John Sharpe



A FINAL DEFENSE OF DISTRIBUTISM

[Editor's Note: I would like to take this time to thank all those who contributed to this lively informal debate on the topic of Catholicism and economics, including Mr. Sharpe, Mr. Clark, Br. Bugnolo and Dr. Woods. To wrap up this current discussion and in response to numerous reader requests to hear from the Distributist side once more, Mr. Sharpe has been asked to provide a final rebuttal.]

A word of thanks to Mr. Miller of Seattle Catholic for the opportunity to respond to Mr. Clark's response to my response, etc., etc. I will attempt in what follows to summarize the results of our exchange, and point out where I think points which I made have been either conceded, missed, or misunderstood. Begging the reader's forgiveness, I will also touch briefly on several new arguments which were raised against the Distributist position, both by Mr. Clark and by Dr. Woods, who contributed to the debate after it was in progress. Those new points include the following: 1) numerous theologians have supported capitalism, 2) capitalism has reduced the gap between rich and poor and thus does not promote inequality, 3) Distributism would be productive of "big government," and, finally, 4) it is illegitimate to expect the free market or the science of economics to take morality into account, as both are fundamentally neutral. In what follows I also assume that readers are familiar, at least in general, with the articles that have been written by Dr. Woods and Mr. Clark in connection with this discussion.1

CONCESSIONS

To my mind, the following points were ignored and, therefore, conceded:

(1) Belloc's definition of capitalism. It was dismissed as "simplistic" by Mr. Clark, but we saw how it was also the definition of Pope Pius XI, who was probably not a simpleton. Speaking of the definition of capitalism, I also conceded to Mr. Clark that in modern terms the notion of "capitalism" does indeed imply a regime of free competition, as he suggested. This was and is central to my critique of capitalism. More on that later.

(2) Distributism a new theory. I maintained that Distributism was a new and awkward word for a very old theory, a theory of widely distributed ownership not only of material wealth in general, but of productive wealth specifically. I said, in fact, that "...the ideal, at which great statesmen from Solon of Athens to Leo XIII and Pius XI have aimed, is a State made up principally of flourishing and self-contained communities of small proprietors, and especially of small farmers or peasants." This too was not refuted. Mr. Clark only said, essentially, that capitalism didn't come from Protestantism; he provided no evidence to suggest that Belloc was wrong, however, in noting that the concentration of wealth characteristic of capitalist society resulted, at least in England, from a few unique events triggered by the Reformation — events which he details in his tidy Essay on the Restoration of Property. Those events were made possible, furthermore, by the breakdown of laws and structures which preserved the "Distributist" nature of society up to that point. More on Mr. Clark's other comments in this regard later. Suffice it to say that my contention that a society of many small owners, rather than a few big ones, has always been the ideal of great statesmen and sane thinkers, was never refuted.

(3) Radical equality and Socialism. Belloc maintained that the gross inequality of modern society, which has owners pitted against an essentially non-owning class, is too much to bear; in so stating he simply follows the Popes. (We'll see more of this in our brief look at the so-called "capitalism-creates-inequality" myth.) I pointed out in my original article, however, that Belloc admitted in several places of his Essay that inequality is natural in society and should be respected; his was not a scheme of radical leveling but one of defending the small owner. I also made it perfectly clear that Belloc opposed socialism as vigorously as he opposed capitalism. Furthermore, I looked in detail at the phrase — taken out of context by Mr. Clark — in which Belloc says that the state should own certain forms of property before those forms are left to the ownership of a few wealthy men; I demonstrated that such a statement was not only miles away from an advocacy of Socialism, but was rather completely consistent with the words of the Pontiff who had condemned socialism so vigorously!2

Just to be perfectly clear, I will reiterate: at no point and in no phrase of any of Belloc's writing does he demand radical, Socialist equality; at no point and in no phrase does he object to the fundamentally Catholic notion that society will always consist of varying degrees of inequality; at no point and in no phrase does he advocate the application of taxation to redistribute personal wealth to those who have less; at no point and in no phrase does he argue for repressively high, "tyrannical" taxation (to use Clark's word) — in fact he devotes an entire chapter of Restoration of Property (VI) to opposing high taxation. In so doing he is perfectly in agreement with the actual words (though perhaps not with Clark's unsupportable interpretation) of Navarette's statement, which Clark quoted: "The origin of poverty is high taxes. In continual fear of tax collectors, (farmers) prefer to abandon their land, so they can avoid their vexations." This is exactly what Belloc said!

In making these points I was and am trying to further illustrate the general vision behind Belloc's scheme in Restoration of Property. He desired no redistribution of wealth á la Marx; but he did advocate a defense of the small owner.

The burden of proof thus lies with Mr. Clark to demonstrate that Belloc advocated socialism. The only reply from Mr. Clark on this point was to insinuate that Belloc thought that the wage contract was fundamentally unjust — because Belloc referred to the "exploitation" of wage earners. But Belloc clearly respected the justice of the wage contract.3 For Mr. Clark to prove that Belloc advocated socialism — which was his original contention — we need more concrete, factual evidence from him than the assertion that "Belloc's terminology was eerily similar to that of Marx." Such a statement, in light of what I have demonstrated, is hardly a scholarly demonstration of Belloc's socialist sympathies.

(4) The Means of Production. I spent a section of my article explaining that Belloc specifically — and Distributists in general — has no objection to an entrepreneur being paid more for his efforts than that of the assembly line wage-earner. The Distributist objection to the capitalist scheme has to do with wages only tangentially, and is rooted more in how capital ownership is currently distributed among the members of society. Because of this current distribution, relatively few own the means of production, and the rest are compelled by the very structure of the thing to work for those few in exchange for a wage. This essential point — the very foundation of the Distributist premise — was and is never, ever refuted. Regardless of how both rich and poor have microwave ovens and TVs, and how an entrepreneur is entitled to be compensated more than a shoe repair man — provided he is truly providing a useful service to the community with his large, complicated, capital-intensive venture, the fact is that wage-earners cannot have the dignity, freedom, and independence of capital owners because they own no productive wealth with which they can themselves produce wealth for consumption. Pius XI called such a state "hand-to-mouth uncertainty," 4 and Pius XII called it "economic dependence and slavery which is irreconcilable with [a man's] rights as a person." 5 That's the beginning and the end of the point.

(5) Free competition. Another point which I made was that free or unrestricted competition cannot be the final, regulating factor in economic life. I also suggested that regulation and defense of private property from the destructive effects of unrestricted competition was not to regulate private property out of existence, but to defend it and protect it.6 The first point was made clearly time and again by Pope Leo XIII, Pope Pius XI, and Pope Pius XII, and the latter was affirmed with unparalleled explicitness by Pope Pius XI. Neither aspect of that observation was ever refuted by Mr. Clark either. He suggests that the government should stay out of regulating economic life, lest it become an "all-powerful leviathan," but that is hardly a response to a clear declaration by several Popes that "the right ordering of economic life cannot be left to a free competition of forces. For from this source, as from a poisoned spring, have originated and spread all the errors of individualist economic teaching" 7 (emphasis mine) We'll look quickly later on at the myth of "big government." Let it be reaffirmed here, that the Church has solemnly condemned unrestricted competition, and there is no refuting that.

(6) Profit. Mr. Clark chose not to address the profit aspect of my previous article. Another conceded point, evidently. The essence of my position was that profit is only licit from the Catholic standpoint as a means to an end — namely, the procuring of necessary goods for one's self and one's family, and that a desire for gain which is not circumscribed by that very specific intention is immoral and illicit, and thus also illegitimate as a principle of social order. This issue was only addressed in a related fashion by Dr. Woods, and I'll respond to those points very briefly below.

(7) The Social Doctrine of the Church. Another conceded point was my original contention that the fundamental tenet of the Social Doctrine of the Church is the idea that society should be an aid to virtue, not a hindrance. I maintained that a society which legally and publicly recognizes an unlimited "profit motive" — one unconcerned with how the amassing of productive wealth adversely affects the rest of society — is a society fundamentally disordered and inconsistent with Catholic teaching. I would argue that this is plainly and simply true, and therefore impossible to refute. Which may explain the absence of a refutation.

REBUTTALS

In several instances, Mr. Clark offered rebuttals to my original points. Dr. Woods additionally offered his responses to some of the observations that I made, in the pieces which he contributed to this debate. I would ask the reader to consider the following in response:

(1) The greatest minds of the Church. Mr. Clark claimed to be able to cite "fifteen references [to] pre-medieval and medieval Catholic economists," and complained that I quoted "exactly one Catholic prior to Rerum Novarum." He further lamented that I relied "almost exclusively on Hilaire Belloc, Chesterton, and some of the papal encyclicals."

Firstly, Clark's references to the "fifteen theologians" are — begging forgiveness for the terms — completely useless and irrelevant. He lists 15 names; he doesn't quote from any of them. The reader will forgive me if I do not take Mr. Clark's word for it that all 15 theologians were proto-capitalists.8 If he's so familiar with their work (albeit through an obviously liberal lens), why not quote them, at length, so that we too can learn that the Scholastic philosophers supported a massive concentration of productive property into a relatively few hands (a phenomena which, it should be remembered, Mr. Clark did not deny), perpetuated by a regime of unlimited economic competition? I defy anyone (!) to produce a single citation from any Catholic philosopher (who is not an admitted liberal like Bastiat) which says that a concentration of wealth such as we see today, created and/or encouraged by totally free competition, is a desirable state of affairs. No such quote is possible.

An additional fact to bear in mind is that the Church, in most cases throughout Her history, has reacted to historical circumstances and issued condemnations of social or theological trends after those trends took a wrong turn. St. Albert the Great's defense of private property is hardly an apologia for a concentration of wealth. How can we expect to hear fierce denunciations of economic rationalism/liberalism from clerics who lived before the problem had manifested itself socially or philosophically? When I said that the great minds of the Church would not have sanctioned Mr. Clark's praise of capitalism, I meant those minds who considered capitalism in retrospect, from a point in history after capitalism had developed. It is not a coincidence in my mind that those theologians who examined capitalism from a modern perspective were almost all of one mind in condemning it. For readers interested in this aspect of the question, they are encouraged to consult the writings of Fr. Heinrich Pesch, Fr. Oswald von Nell-Breuning, Fr. Bernard Dempsey, Fr. John Ryan, Dr. Amintore Fanfani, Dr. George O'Brien, Dr. Charles Devas, Fr. Matteo Liberatore, Fr. Denis Fahey, Fr. Edward Cahill, Mgr. Emile Guerry, and the numerous other Social Catholics who wrestled with the problem of the modern economy. Such a list should be enough to refute the implication that I, in a "misleading" and "unscholarly" fashion, meant to portray only Chesterton (whom I didn't mention once!) and Belloc as the Church's greatest minds on the economic question.

It is worth mentioning that the one theologian from whom I did quote in my previous article is, according to Holy Mother Church, our chief guide in matters economic. That one was St. Thomas Aquinas, who, as Pius XI taught, "is...the perfect theologian, [who] gives infallible rules and precepts of life not only for individuals, but also for civil and domestic society which is the object also of moral science, both economic and political." 9 (emphasis mine)

Finally, I will here point out that Mr. Clark grudgingly admitted that I quoted from "some of the papal encyclicals," as if to base myself on such sources were to condemn myself to the unscholarly oblivion of ignorance and naiveté. This is an argument about what Catholics should think about the economic order, and quoting the major encyclicals on economic problems isn't sufficient!?! Clark asserts that Pope Leo XIII "was no anti-capitalist." While Leo along with all the other popes, theologians, and Belloc (as we have noted) didn't impugn the legitimacy of a contract between a wage earner and an owner of capital, he and his successors most certainly condemned an economic order based upon unrestricted competition and rationalist principles! And the notion of unlimited competition is — according to Mr. Clark — a prime element of modern capitalism...an element condemned in most vigorous terms by Pius XI, in spite of Clark's contention that the social encyclicals intended "simply to state that employers should treat their employees as beings created by God." If such were the case, what are we to make of Pius XI's teaching that public authority can justly regulate what owners do or do not do with their property (49), that free competition must be controlled by the state or other legitimate authority (110), that wealth is immensely concentrated as a result of free competition (105, 107)...and on and on and on? To dismiss the teaching of Pius XI as applying merely to how employers are supposed to treat their employees is to grossly misrepresent the pontiff's teaching.

A final note on the encyclicals. Mr. Clark maintains that "Pope John Paul II is really the first modern Pontiff to delve into capitalism proper, and analyze it on its own merits." My interpretation of his meaning is that he is the first Pope worth quoting since he admitted the merits of capitalism, because his predecessors analyzed it in detail (Quadragesimo Anno is over 20,000 words long!) and found it wanting. Insofar as the statements of Pius XI and others which I have quoted refer to principle and not contingent facts,10 I am certain that all Catholics will continue to admit their binding force. I further trust we are all agreed that the Holy Father did not intend to contradict his predecessors.

(2) The history of capitalism. Mr. Clark maintains that Belloc's thesis must be rejected, insofar as Prof. de Roover has suggested that "Modern capitalism based on private ownership has its roots in Italy during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance." A couple of points in reply:

First, the thesis is not merely Belloc's. It is Weber's, Fanfani's, O'Brien's, and Fahey's. Space doesn't permit me to quote from them extensively, but I would be happy to provide more information as and when requested.

Second, the "Bellocian thesis" is not that the historical phenomena of division of labor, stock speculation, capital-intensive production and trade, and banking were created overnight after Luther nailed his 95 theses to the door of the Wittenberg cathedral. In England, at least, it is simply a fact that the concentrations of wealth which made "big business" possible resulted from, among other things, the confiscation of Church lands and the implementation of the Statute of Frauds passed after Henry VIII's break with Rome.

Additionally, as Mr. Clark said very clearly in his first article, capitalism implies the right to private property and free competition. One without the other would cease to be capitalism. So even in France, Italy, and other places where pre-Reformation concentrations of capital existed for the carrying out of large, capital-intensive operations, without the mentality of "unrestricted competition" which is today part of the essence of the "free market," capitalism as we know it would not have existed. This is a point which Clark's source, Prof. de Roover, seems unwilling to grapple with in most of his writings. It took a change in mentality to foster capitalism as we know it, and that change of mentality was furthered by an emancipation of morals from the authority of Rome: i.e., Protestantism.

(3) Capitalism doesn't create inequality. I will ask for the reader's indulgence if I respond with slightly more than, "Yes, it does."

This is primarily Dr. Woods' contention, that the "capitalism-creates-inequality myth" is simply an "ignorant canard." He emphasizes the point in two different ways: first, by reminding us that the destitute were employed by the factories, and so they would otherwise have perished, were it not for the labor-creating factories; second, by reminding us that both rich and poor classes today have TVs, microwaves, radios, access to air travel, etc., etc.

To this first point I simply respond by saying that the massive and rapid growth of the factory system wouldn't have been possible without the destruction of some aspects of the Distributist society which existed beforehand. If the factories are to be thanked for providing employment for the hungry masses, the question which comes to mind is: "Where did all the hungry masses come from in the first place?" It is a stunt of circular reasoning to suggest that they failed on their land or at their trade and so had to be employed by the factories to survive, because 1) they lost their land in the first place as a result of events that Belloc mentioned (and that we have noted briefly above), and 2) their home-grown trade would have been made ineffective or impossible in raw competition with a capital-intensive, assembly-line method of production which could turn out hundreds of times the amount of goods, at far cheaper costs — which is the very problem which Distributism seeks to remedy! In essence, the balance of the small, predominantly cottage economy was upset by the triumph of the factory system on a large scale, combined with a liberal, "no-holds-barred" economic philosophy, and the combined result was the wholesale transformation of land-owning peasants into employees.

It should, finally, be born in mind that the question of wealth distribution is not a question of who has the most toys, but rather a question of who possesses productive wealth, which can be worked to generate the wealth to live on. It is this kind of wealth which is mal-distributed, and this kind of mal-distribution thereof which Distributism, with the Popes, seeks to remedy. Neither Leo XIII, nor Pius XI, nor Pius XII lamented the "sad lack of modern conveniences among poorer families, the scarcity of TV- and microwave-owning families who lord their gadgets over the poor, along with the gross inequality in health standards." Pius XI called the non-owning workers the "proletariat" — propertyless. The non-owning workers (like most all of us) possess no productive property of their own to make their labor productive of wealth absent someone else's capital, thus producing the precarious state of "economic dependence" (Pius XII's phrase) and "hand-to-mouth uncertainty" (Pius XI's). That such a state still exists today should be obvious from current headlines, which almost daily announce a new round of layoffs in the thousands from corporations both large and small.

Pius XI even concedes — in anticipation of Dr. Woods' objection — that "the status of non-owning workers is to be carefully distinguished from pauperism," and that "the workers can no longer be considered universally overwhelmed with misery and lacking the necessities of life." 11 But he nevertheless maintains "that the immense multitude of the non-owning workers on the one hand and the enormous riches of certain very wealthy men on the other establish an unanswerable argument that the riches which are so abundantly produced in our age of 'industrialism,' as it is called, are not rightly distributed and equitably made available to the various classes of the people" 12 (emphasis mine), and that this inequality is a "fruit that the unlimited freedom of struggle among competitors has of its own nature produced" 13 (emphasis mine). So much for the "ignorant canard."

(4) Profit. Dr. Woods took the lead in rebutting this point, as well, with what I assume was somewhat of a justification of "the profit motive" in suggesting that "profit signals...make for peaceful social cooperation and the most efficient use of scarce resources." Elsewhere he asserts that "the morally acceptable desire for profit leads to spontaneous social cooperation."

I have serious qualms with both of those statements. That our system produces "peaceful" social cooperation is only true insofar as most of us aren't murdering one another to buy sugar and flour. But it is to contradict the prevailing spirit which demands that a business continuously increase its "market share" (at who's expense, we wonder...?) or go under. How many small business have to shut their doors because of the big ones before we abandon the "peaceful social cooperation myth"? Doubtless Dr. Woods would consider the evacuation of a small farm in the face of agri-business a "signal from the consumer" that high broccoli prices will no longer be tolerated, but has it occurred to him that the low prices wouldn't be a factor if the regime of unlimited competition weren't the prevailing economic doctrine? What if everybody more or less sold broccoli at the same price, and the question turned on not who could undercut the competition, but simply "how much broccoli do we need?"

Finally, to say that the "desire for profit" is "morally acceptable" is to frame the question with certain definite assumptions which do not factor in modern economic life. That wage-earners bring home a pay check to meet basic needs — and thus are behaving morally in so doing — is a stark fact of life. That CEO's bring home a salary several hundred times that of the average worker has little to do with need, and everything to do with avarice. So too for the industry that insists upon expanding — for "market share," "dividends," or pure "profit" — to the detriment of the small holders of property who otherwise would have maintained themselves in reasonable comfort while working on their own productive property. It is only a system of pure liberalism that would suggest that such avarice should be ignored by the "free market" as solely a personal religious or moral issue, in which economics has no role to play. Such would be pure rationalism applied to political and economic life, of the kind denounced by Leo XIII and all the recent Pius's. Pius XI referred, in fact, to the salutary role that the state could play in redressing such grievous imbalances in his encyclical — believe it or not! — against communism:

...the wealthy classes must be induced to assume those burdens without which human society cannot be saved nor they themselves remain secure. However, measures taken by the State with this end in view ought to be of such a nature that they will really affect those who actually possess more than their share of capital resources, and who continue to accumulate them to the grievous detriment of others.14 (emphasis mine)

NEW ISSUES

Several new issues were raised both by Mr. Clark and Dr. Woods in their responses to the Distributist position, and I will tackle those now, as briefly as I can.

(1) Moral neutrality of economics; economics a value-free science. Clark's contribution to this theme was to compare capitalism to an automobile, implying that it is a neutral tool to be used for good or evil. Dr. Woods elsewhere suggested that the problem of greed is "a matter of moral philosophy rather than economics;" and he further explained that economics is a "value-free" science which doesn't tell people how much money they can make or how to employ their wealth.

I answer that: All of these statements imply that the creation of wealth for use by man is simply a matter of technique, science, and practical knowledge — as if wealth could be created by this or that system interchangeably and inconsequentially, as if it were simply a choice in woodcarving between this or that knife, this or that file.

The fact is, however, that an economic order is not a lifeless piece of matter, to be manipulated according to forces of nature governing that inanimate matter. It is a scheme whereby living, animated creatures produce the wealth necessary for life on earth, to further their practice of virtue and thereby (God willing) attain heaven. Thus there can be no "limitless" wealth creation because the end of wealth creation is subordinate to the end of man, which is God. Wherever limitless wealth creation runs up against moral concerns — like the right of a "competitor" to possess his productive property in peace, the right of labor to a fair share of the fruits of production, the right of labor to be treated as something essential to life and dignity, rather than as a commodity — then the moral concerns must triumph, and economic concerns take a subordinate place. Anything else is simply not Catholic.

Such a conclusion is not pie-in-the-sky dreaming, or naïve wishful thinking. It is Catholic science, backed up by a scholarly tradition much longer than that of rationalist and liberal economic "science." 15 For a truly Catholic economic understanding maintains that the art of acquiring wealth (money-making) or producing wealth (this could be any number of arts: manufacture, agriculture, etc.), is limited by the science of using wealth (Political Economy); the science of using wealth is subordinate to political science which looks after the common good of the nation as a whole; and the science which looks after the nation is itself a moral science.16 "The best usage of the present time," says the Catholic Encyclopedia, "is to make political economy an ethical science, that is, to make it include a discussion of what ought to be in the economic world as well as what is. This has all along been the practice of Catholic writers. Some of them even go so far as to make political economy a branch of ethics and not an independent science." 17 Elsewhere the Encyclopedia emphasizes the point:

Ethics is distinguished from the other natural sciences which deal with moral conduct of man, as jurisprudence and pedagogy, in this, that the latter do not ascend to first principles, but borrow their fundamental notions from ethics, and are therefore subordinate to it. To investigate what constitutes good or bad, just or unjust, what is virtue, law, conscience, duty, etc., what obligations are common to all men, does not lie within the scope of jurisprudence or pedagogy, but of ethics; and yet these principles must be presupposed by the former, must serve them as a ground-work and guide; hence they are subordinated to ethics. The same is true of political economy. The latter is indeed immediately concerned with man's social activity inasmuch as it treats of the production, distribution and consumption of material commodities, but this activity is not independent of ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance with the moral law and must be dominated by justice, equity, and love. Political economy was wholly wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the requirements of ethics.18

Readers who are interested in further defense of this subject are asked to see Appendix II.

(2) A note on "Big government." All this talk of "government regulation" makes modern opponents of Distributism nervous that Big Brother (he's really our Uncle) will exercise a sweeping and oppressive amount of authority to make sure that the rich don't get too rich. This fear is in one sense well-founded, insofar as modern "liberal" governments have a long and robust track record of useless (and usually nefarious) encroachments on the just liberties of their citizens. It should be borne in mind, however, even as we concede this fear, that the massive coercive power of the modern state is itself a violation of the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity, and so the State that the Pontiffs imagine is the whole body of small and intermediate bodies which make up the whole fabric of the civil authority. Thus the Distributist question, in practice, becomes one of "what can we accomplish today, in present circumstances, to live economically, as well as morally, like Catholics." Such is a separate question from the theory, which we have been debating in these pages.

On the other hand this fear is completely unfounded and polemically irrelevant. To argue against the use of a thing from its abuse is a very sophistical procedure, to use the phrase of the Thomist, Fr. Matteo Liberatore. Pius XI and the Distributists aren't arguing for oppression, they're arguing for the defense of the weak from the oppression of the economically strong. Critiquing an implementation of Distributism — or Catholic economics generally — which includes the "power to the state" part but leaves out the question of what exactly the state will be empowered to do, is not to criticize Distributism at all, but rather to defeat a straw man with the hopes that the unsuspecting will dismiss the real man along with him. Finally, if Pius XI's idea of the State justly regulating economic life gives Catholics the uncomfortable sense that their "rights" are being violated and their "freedom" is being curtailed, then it is not the Pope who has to adjust his view of what the state can and cannot do; it is Catholics who must recalibrate their notion of "rights" and "freedom" to correspond with the Teaching of the Church.

It is worth noting at this juncture that we can't have our cake and eat it too, nor can any of my opponents. Dr. Woods suggests that Distributism is a bad idea today because "theologians from 800 years ago couldn't have imagined the evil of the modern state." I would humbly submit to the reader that they couldn't have imagined the evil of modern capitalism either, and thus the citations from 13th century Thomists and 15th century Jesuits are wholly irrelevant as a vindication of modern capitalism.

(3) Emigration. Mr. Clark says that high tax will drive out the entrepreneur: "the state would progressively tax the ablest entrepreneurs to the point where they can no longer increase their profits and wealth." Two very simple answers:

1) The state will not tax entrepreneurial skill; the state will tax an amassing of wealth which begins to eliminate the ability of others to own productive property.

2) If said entrepreneurs are unhappy because their profits and wealth are limited, I bid them good riddance. Mr. Clark makes the point for me: "If your principle is that capitalists are greedy men, who care about nothing except profits, why would they stay in a country that limits the amount of money they can make? The ablest entrepreneurs will move somewhere else, leaving those who have never run businesses with the job of running businesses." I will simply reply to the final sentence with the remark I made in my earlier article. It is a strange thing that our pre-capitalist ancestors were capable of pulling off such feats of grandeur like constructing cathedrals when they were faced with the oppressive, anti-competitive restrictions of the Guild System, which allegedly wrecks all entrepreneurial spirit. Could it be that "social cooperation" results more from socially sanctioned and encouraged cooperation than from "survival-of-the-fittest" economics?

(4) Trade. Mr. Clark suggests that international trade will be impossible in a Distributist society.

I reply: That's not true. It will occur where necessary, because the purpose of trade is not to allow a foreign country to destabilize prices and the entire economic order by importing cheap goods produced by cheaper labor, where those goods are already produced by the home country; the purpose is to supply what is naturally lacking to that country. In other words, the Thomistic justification for international trade is not for Chinese shoemakers to put American shoemakers out of business, but, according to Clark's own citation, to supply a need where a country cannot supply the same need on its own.

Unfortunately, this technique — of quoting someone and then completely and misleadingly reinterpreting it — is typical of Mr. Clark's style. He suggests that trade is in and of itself worthwhile and justifiable, and thus he laments that Distributism would allegedly make trade impossible. But the citations he produces all say that trade supplies a need which the city cannot supply on its own. Most erroneous is Clark's statement — allegedly a conclusion from St. Thomas: "The perfect city is one that engages in trade." But St. Thomas didn't say that. He said that the city will make use of trade where necessary, but that the ideal city will tend towards self-sufficiency, to the exclusion of trade altogether. I quote here the entire passage to illustrate the degree to which St. Thomas is misrepresented:

The more dignified a thing is the more self-sufficient it is, since whatever needs another's help is by that fact proven to be deficient. Now the city which is supplied by the surrounding country with all its vital needs is more self-sufficient than another which must obtain those supplies by trade. A city therefore which has an abundance of food from its own territory is more dignified than one which is provisioned through trade.19

Furthermore, St. Thomas has harsh words for a society in which most if not all of the citizens are mixed up in commerce, as all of us are. His description of such a society is eminently applicable to our time:

If the citizens themselves devote their life to matters of trade, the way will be opened to many vices. Since the foremost tendency of tradesmen is to make money, greed is awakened in the hearts of the citizens through the pursuit of trade. The result is that everything in the city will become venal; good faith will be destroyed and the way opened to all kinds of trickery; each one will work only for his own profit, despising the public good; the cultivation of virtue will fail since honor, virtue's reward, will be bestowed upon the rich. Thus, in such a city, civic life will necessarily be corrupted.20

A final comment on trade. Clark's example illustrates the inherent wisdom of Distributism. He suggests that trade will be impossible in the event that certain goods are manufactured at home and the foreign commodity threatens to undercut them in terms of price. Indeed so. For the Distributist perspective maintains that the integrity of the national economy, and the livelihood of individual men and women which results from their practice of a trade or craft, is more important that the capitalist's need to "expand his market" or "increase his market share." There can be no question that these two mentalities are one hundred percent at odds, and that the Distributist thinks of men and nations whereas capitalism thinks only of money.

A CONCLUDING NOTE ON THE SOCIAL VISION OF THE CHURCH

At the risk of repeating myself, I beg leave to remind readers that Distributism does not — as Mr. Clark suggests — intend to represent itself as a sine qua non of a moral society. It does however claim to be an economic system which is consistent with the demands of morality and the Social Doctrine of the Church. Insofar as my comments on the Social Doctrine of the Church were ignored by those attempting to refute the Distributist position, I offer in closing an expanded recapitulation of where the Distributists are coming from in terms of that Doctrine.


***
Distributism is broadly thought of, by its advocates, as an implementation of the Social Doctrine of the Church. It is so because it is a program that is consistent with the natural law and, because, in the final analysis, it will help man along the path to Heaven rather than throw him off it.

The essence of the Social Doctrine is that society is a means to an end. The temporal common good — the moral and material goods of this life — which it is society's duty to protect and foster, serves ultimately another end: the Eternal Salvation of men.21 As a result, every law, every custom, every ordinance of the earthly community is salutary insofar as it makes man's journey to Heaven easier, and is disordered whenever it makes that journey more difficult.

St. Thomas made this point explicitly clear in his instruction to the King of Cyprus: "it pertains to the king's office to promote the good life of the multitude in such a way as to make it suitable for the attainment of heavenly happiness, that is to say, he should command those things which lead to the happiness of Heaven, and as far as possible, forbid the contrary." 22 He says in his treatise on law in the Summa that "The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually." 23 He concedes, of course that the law cannot forbid all vices, nor command all virtues, but this is a far cry from saying that the law is indifferent to virtue and vice, and seeks only to "preserve the peace" so that man can do what he pleases, as both new and old liberals tell us.

It was very correctly, if unintentionally, said by Dr. Woods recently that the essential point is the relationship between the law and morals. Someone had written to him "to point out what Distributists and other critics of the market consistently fail to acknowledge (sic): 'No one claims that anyone can, morally speaking, do simply whatever he wants with his property; the question is over exactly which uses are immoral uses, and which of these immoral uses ought also to be illegal ones.'" The point is, rather, one which Distributists, with the Popes, consistently bear in mind; the difference is that the Distributists offer a Catholic answer to the question, rather than a liberal one.

As we have seen, Pius XI referred specifically to Leo XIII's teaching on the state and economic life as "boldly breaking through the confines imposed by Liberalism" 24 (emphasis mine). His own teaching was the same. Acknowledging the true human inclination towards evil as stemming from Original Sin, he nevertheless affirmed that the "unquenchable thirst for riches and temporal goods, which has at all times impelled men to break God's laws and trample upon the rights of their neighbors...on account of the present system of economic life, is laying far more numerous snares for human frailty" 25 (emphasis mine). That system could have been reformed, he says, by "strict and watchful moral restraint enforced vigorously by governmental authority," 26 but it was not, and it has left us with a "whole scheme of social and economic life [which] is now such as to put in the way of vast numbers of mankind most serious obstacles which prevent them from caring for the one thing necessary." As such, that system must either be condemned, or the Social Doctrine denied.

This point is often lost on the opponents of Distributism, who insist that economic life is neutral and that the creation, distribution, consumption, and exchange of wealth is simply a technical process, which is affected by morality only insofar as the individuals who interact with that process choose to allow moral considerations to enter into their thoughts and actions. Such a mindset, whether the root of an erroneous conception of economic science, an infatuation with Austrian economics,27 or a general absorption of the prevailing liberalism which has always, unfortunately, been part of American life, is fundamentally false. It is an expression of that "body of economic teaching far removed from the true moral law" which developed from "the principles of rationalism" and which, contrary to every Catholic sense of the purpose of law, civil life, and the social order, gave "completely free rein...to human passions." 28

The alternative is a conception of temporal life which recognizes the role of law and society in restraining human passions, to the extent possible and appropriate, and guiding human life, such that the whole social fabric becomes a help to salvation.

In light of this most important of all truths of Catholic Social Doctrine, it should be easy to see that Distributism is consistent with the Catholic economic vision insofar as it subordinates economic life to the ultimate purpose of man's life. It does not curtail the right of a man to own and use his private property; its entire program is designed to safeguard and defend that right, and to ensure that most if not all in society are able to benefit from it, in a matter befitting their dignity and independence as man, and not merely as potential employees. But defending private property assumes that there is something to defend it against: which is the notion that private property is an end in itself, to be amassed and multiplied and owned without limit.

"The art of amassing wealth," said St. Thomas, "which is solely concerned with money, is infinite." 29 Where that art is pursued for its own sake, where it is governed by a "profit motive" which possesses no built-in limit but is rather an end unto itself, it leads simply and directly to yet further desire for wealth: "Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible." 30 The incarnation of that mentality is the modern economic system which not only encourages (by its philosophy) the unlimited acquisition of wealth, but sanctions (by its practice) an expanding field of ownership by a few at the expense of widespread and distributed ownership by many. It is this scheme of things that Distributism opposes, and for which it offers a remedy.

I have often remarked that modern society, cut off as it is from the Moral Law, is simply an example of institutionalized Original Sin. It does not reflect the Truth, but is rather more often than not an incarnation of error and sin. An interesting illustration of this is found in the hypothetical exchange of Article 1, Question 77, of the second part of the second part of St. Thomas's Summa. In attempting to defend the "buy low, sell high" mentality in all circumstances, without restriction, the Objector says that what is common to all men would seem to be natural, and thus cannot be sinful. He continues, attempting to cite St. Augustine in his defense: "Augustine relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by all, 'You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium.'" St. Thomas's reply is illustrative, and reveals the essential flaw with our entire economic outlook. The Angelic Doctor further quotes St. Augustine: "'this jester, either by looking into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination.'" "Hence it is evident," St. Thomas concludes, "that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin." Institutionalizing this desire to buy for a song and sell at a premium is the glory of modern capitalism. Replacing this regime with one that encourages virtue, not merely internally but also by the very fabric of society, is the aim of the Distributists and all Social Catholics, who hope both for the Restoration of Property to the non-owning masses, and the restoration of true economic science, subordinate to the real needs of man and to the just decrees of God.


***




Appendix I - a note on the "libertarian" Scholastics

In addition to citing the works of the Austrian economists, many of the opponents of Distributism are fond of citing the works of the Spanish Jesuits of Salamanca in evident defense of their liberal economic positions. However, Dr. William F. Campbell, a retired Professor of Economics with Louisiana State University, and current secretary of the Philadelphia Society, stated recently that, "Libertarians often find the quotes they are looking for in treatises on natural law which include materials on property and contracts. Unfortunately they are often taken out of context of the whole juridical and political philosophy of which they are a part. It is similar to saying that Aristotle is a libertarian because he stresses the commonsense arguments for private property."

The problem is that we're at the mercy of the pro-capitalists who quote St. Bernardine, St. Albert, St. Antoninus, the Spanish Scholastics, etc., because none of their works are available in English in complete form. Most of them quote from Alejandro Chafuen's book Christians for Freedom — heartily recommended by Dr. Woods in his latest article, which allegedly demonstrates that the late Spanish Scholastics were proto-Capitalists of the liberal and/or libertarian variety.

Dr. Chafuen's work, however, should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. His work is certainly not the absolute standard against which Catholic's economic views should be measured. Firstly, he is — now for over 20 years — a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, a notorious exponent of the free-for-all liberalism of the classical economists, which was condemned by the Church time and again as rationalism was making its way across Europe like a veritable plague during the 18th and 19th centuries; and that rationalism is exactly the kind which inspires liberals and libertarians who are imbued with the erroneous notion that economics can be treated as a science independent of morals, and the role of the state should be that of a mere "watchdog" guaranteeing the maximum of license to the maximum of individuals.

Secondly, like many others arguing that the Scholastics were "proto-capitalists," he — at least in some instances31 — omits the context surrounding his citations from the allegedly pro-capitalist theologians. As an illustration of this, I offer the following. In an address to the Philadelphia Society in 1997, he made the claim, while discussing the legitimacy of making a profit based upon information unknown to other participants in the market, that the modern economist Israel Kirzner had come to this same conclusion as St. Thomas Aquinas: "Failing to divulge information to others (without engaging in misrepresentation) may not be very noble; it may even, under certain circumstances, be deemed to be downright disgusting; but it constitutes neither robbery nor fraud." Well, in the right context the statement may be very true. In another context, however, it is completely false. St. Thomas taught, for instance, that a seller of an item which is defective, when the defect is not obvious, must declare outright the item's defect and adjust the price downward accordingly; failure to do so would render the sale "fraudulent." 32

It is perfectly legitimate, and even obligatory if we're interested in the truth, to ask the following question: How many of the other isolated statements, offered in defense of the supposed capitalist sympathies of the great Catholic theologians of the past, have really no bearing whatsoever on the question at hand, or even misstate the actual position of those theologians?

Examples of this phenomena abound: St. Bernardine and St. Antoninus are often claimed as part of the capitalist/free-market camp. Never mind the fact that St. Bernardine condemned the practice of selling a product at a lower price than is normally established as unjust toward other participants in the market who attempt to sell at the established price (how pro-capitalist is that?), and that St. Antoninus wanted the just price of major commodities to be fixed by the state as an inducement to honest trade.33

We should be careful to accept the economic doctrine of the Church only from those who have an unsullied reputation for orthodoxy in all areas of Catholic teaching, not excepting politics and economics, and leave it to the capitalists to prove that these random, isolated statements from the late Scholastics and others have any relevance in a debate about the licitness of the modern economic order in light of the Faith.



Appendix II - further notes on the true economic science

The amount of material on truly Catholic economics abounds. I offer here some further observations for those who wish to explore the topic in greater detail.

Devas, for instance, in his Political Economy, says:

If we are agreed on the true philosophical view of the nature and destiny of man and of his surroundings, we ought to have little difficulty in agreeing on the position of economics among the sciences. It is a part of moral philosophy or ethics, which, in the widest sense, is itself that part of philosophy which regards the moral order.

And Liberatore, in his Principles of Political Economy, maintains that "Political Economy is of its nature subordinate to Political Science, [and] it is consequently subordinate to Moral Science, because Political Science is intrinsically and essentially dependent on Moral Science." The essential point is that for a Catholic, economics is not simply a collection of formulas, charts, graphs, and equations, built out of collections of data or abstract musings upon "how can we make the most stuff," but rather the science which has for its aim the satisfactions of man's material needs in conformity with the truth about man's final destiny and his duty upon earth to pursue it.

Hear again the Catholic Encyclopedia: It is for this reason that the Encyclopedia further states in the same entry that

...the State has to exercise important economical functions. It must protect private property and see to it that in man's industrial life the laws affecting justice be carried out in all their force and vigour. But its duties do not stop here. It should pass such laws as will enable its subjects to procure what is needed for their respectable sustenance and even to attain a moderate competency. Both excessive wealth and extreme poverty involve many dangers to the individual and to society. Hence the State should pass such laws as will favour the sturdy middle class of citizens and add to their numbers. Much can be done to bring about this desirable condition by the enactment of proper tax and inheritance laws, of laws which protect the labouring, manufacturing, and agricultural interests, and which supervise and control trusts, syndicates, etc.

Noteworthy — but not surprising — in the above are the facts that (1) the duties of the State are summarized under the entry for the word "ethics," and (2) enumerated among those duties are the regulation of economic life towards the common good of the whole.

A final point. In a recent article Dr. Woods suggested that the Distributists err by demanding that the economic science reckon with moral issues: "This, I think, is one of the places where Distributists commit an error. They are indicting economics in general and the free market in particular for not doing what they were never intended to do. The market does not prevent people from using their wealth badly; nor does it possess a built-in limit on the amount of wealth that someone can acquire. Neither does the discipline of economics itself have anything to say about these matters, which properly belong to moral philosophy." Dr. Woods misses the point here at several levels.

1) Distributists don't attack economic science generally; they attack the value-free perversion of economics while defending its integrity as a science subordinate to ethics. They don't deny economic law; they refuse to concede that man should be crushed by abstract and rationalist economic law, the way he is crushed by the law of gravity, should he find himself under a falling rock! For Distributists, economic law is, as we have seen, fundamentally subordinate to moral law, which is the supreme law in all fields — including economics — in which human free will is the operative principle.

2) They don't demand that the free market provide moral constraints; they in fact concede that the free(-for-all) market provides nothing of the sort, and this is in fact one of its flaws!

3) They don't demand that an individual man be told what to do with his wealth. They demand that moral limits be observed in the workings of the economic order. So if there is in fact an inviolable moral right for a man to possess private property, then a system that deprives most of an opportunity to own productive property because of its tendency, in the name of the almighty "free market," to concentrate that property, is a system which violates the moral law. And no lengthy dissertation about efficiency and productivity can change the fact that if the right of all to possess private property is a fundamental moral tenet of the Catholic economic position, then an economic system which facilitates the continual violation of that moral tenet must bend to the moral law itself.

4) Finally, Distributists don't demand that there be a limit to the amount of wealth that a man can make (I made this point in my original reply to John Clark; certainly Dr. Woods missed it, and he is not intentionally ignoring the issue). They demand that there be a limit to the concentration of income-generating property into so few hands that most others be compelled to work for a wage rather than with their own share of productive property. It's an essential distinction (I realize I'm repeating myself), and one which Belloc makes quite clearly in Economics for Helen: between wealth for consumption and wealth for future production (i.e., capital). If a family is to sustain itself securely and independently, it has a right to some sufficiency in possession of the latter.



Appendix III - A note on the alleged wisdom of the Austrian economists

Many of the critics of Distributism repeatedly cite the words of Murray Rothbard, Ludwig von Mises, and others of the Austrian school in defense of their position. This infatuation with Austrian economics is indeed a strange phenomenon among Catholics, but it makes sense to some limited degree. The modern libertarians, who trace their economic roots to the Austrian school, have some very intelligent things to say, and I find myself agreeing with many of their conclusions about the modern world (though usually not for the same reasons). They oppose interventionist American foreign policy, and so do I; so should all Catholics. They oppose fractional-reserve banking and favor sound monetary policy; so do I, and so should all Catholics. They oppose an unnecessarily big national government; so do I, and so should all Catholics. They oppose Socialism; so do I, so did Belloc, and so should all Catholics.

But a failure to understand and analyze the "why" behind their position, and substituting for that analysis a naïve, blanket acceptance of all of their utterances is also impossible for a Catholic. The Austrian economists were liberals, plain and simple, following on the heels of the French Physiocrats and the liberal English Political Economists. They opposed socialism not because it violates the natural law as taught by true philosophy and confirmed by Revelation, but because it is less efficiently productive of material wealth than the free market. This is not the Catholic critique of socialism. Furthermore, the original Austrian crusade was to assert the validity of economic "law" against the German Historical School of economics, which maintained that such laws were a fiction. But the "laws" which the Austrians maintained have nothing whatsoever to do with the Natural Law of philosophical realism and the Catholic Faith.

It should not be a surprise, then, that the Austrians display a woeful ignorance of the ideas and principles which underlie the Social Doctrine of the Church, based as it is upon the philosophical and religious Truth about man and society. Von Mises's ignorance of the very notion of a truly Catholic Social Order is evident in the following little snippet, among others, from his famous work, Socialism. Here he attempts to explain the antagonism displayed by the Church toward Liberalism, from a standpoint which is (obviously) profoundly anti-Catholic in spirit, shallow in its reasoning, supremely ignorant of the Faith, and therefore unable to conceive of a Creed which transcends the worn-out poles of Left and Right:

Historically it is easy to understand the dislike which the Church has shown for economic liberty and political Liberalism in any form. Liberalism is the flower of that rational enlightenment which dealt a death blow to the regime of the old Church and from which modern historical criticism has sprung. It was Liberalism that undermined the power of the classes that had for centuries been closely bound up with the Church. It transformed the world more than Christianity had ever done. It restored humanity to the world and to life. It awakened forces which shook the foundations of the inert traditionalism on which Church and creed rested. The new outlook caused the Church great uneasiness, and it has not yet adjusted itself to even the externals of the modern epoch. True, the priests in Catholic countries sprinkle holy water on newly laid railways and dynamos of new power stations, but the professed Christian still shudders inwardly at the workings of a civilization which his faith cannot grasp. The Church strongly resented modernity and the modern spirit. What wonder, then, that it allied itself with those whom resentment had driven to wish for the break-up of this wonderful new world, and feverishly explored its well-stocked arsenal for the means to denounce the earthly struggle for work and wealth. The religion which called itself the religion of love became a religion of hatred in a world that seemed ripe for happiness. Any would-be destroyers of the modern social order could count on finding a champion in Christianity.

Liberalism had "transformed the world more than Christianity had ever done[, and] restored humanity to the world and to life." How charming. Obviously the old days of Workingmen's Guilds and economic life properly subordinated to morals were devoid of life and humanity; true enough, insofar as moral, legal, and canonical limits that are active in the social fabric, and not simply a matter of private conscience, extinguish the "life" of license which all true liberals long for.






FOOTNOTES:
1 Woods, Dr. Thomas, "Piety is no Substitute for Economics," "Three Catholic Cheers for Capitalism," and "Economics and Profit: A Final Word;" and Clark, John, "Distributism as Economic Theory," and "The Capitalist Response." Dr. Woods' articles are available at http://www.lewrockwell.com/woods/woods-arch.html, and Mr. Clark's at http://www.seattlecatholic.com/articles.html.
2 "...certain kinds of property, it is rightly contended, ought to be reserved to the State since they carry with them a dominating power so great that cannot without danger to the general welfare be entrusted to private individuals. Such just demands and desires have nothing in them now which is inconsistent with Christian truth..." Quadragesimo Anno, 114-115.
3 In fact in his essay "The Faith and Industrial Capitalism," Belloc in fact laments the impossibility of a binding religious condemnation of the capitalist economic arrangement; he concedes the justice of a wage contract quite clearly (as would be expected of a man who a faithful Catholic and not an idiot): "What is there [in Catholic morals] to prevent my offering [my] stores of livelihood to destitute men on condition they work my machine...?"
4 Quadragesimo Anno, 61.
5 Christmas Message, 1942.
6 In my original article I made it explicitly clear that Pius XI taught this exactly; cf. QA, 16.
7 Quadragesimo Anno, 88.
8 Readers are asked to consult Appendix I if they desire more information on the alleged proto-capitalism of the Late Scholastics.
9 Studiorum Ducem, 20.
10 Where Pius XI was referring to facts, such as the concentration of wealth during his time, readers are kindly directed to the Shared Capitalism Instutite (http://www.sharedcapitalism.org/scfacts.html) for a look at just how bad the problem remains.
11 Quadragesimo Anno, 60 and 59.
12 Quadragesimo Anno, 60.
13 Quadragesimo Anno, 58.
14 Divini Redemptoris, 75.
15 For the record, I am not claiming, nor would any of the Distributists, that economic study, research, analysis, whatever, cannot produce and has not produced useful insights as to how man might be a more efficient creator of wealth, in a strictly technical, mechanical, and truly "value-free" way (if it even makes sense for a Catholic to use such a term; I would argue that it does not. In both Devas's and Liberatore's texts on political economy can be found a lengthy discussion of what separates art from science. Generally speaking, art deals with technique, science with knowledge based upon first principles. No doubt we are very smart, in part thanks to the Austrians, about the technique of managing the national economy; forgetting that economics is primarily a practical science which includes, assumes, and is founded upon fundamental truths about man and society is where we have gone wrong.). What I am saying, however, is that the economic science, for Catholics, is subordinate to, not independent of, moral philosophy.
16 Cf. Bede Jarrett's Social Theories of the Middle Ages, pp. 153-155. He is paraphrasing St. Thomas's Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle.
17 S.v., "Political Economy"
18 CE, s.v., "Ethics"
19 On Kingship, II, 3.
20 On Kingship, II, 3.
21 "...civil society, established for the common welfare, should not only safeguard the well-being of the community, but have also at heart the interests of its individual members, in such mode as not in any way to hinder, but in every manner to render as easy as may be, the possession of that highest and unchangeable good for which all should seek" (Leo XIII, Immortale Dei (1885), 6).
22 On Kingship, I, 15.
23 II, i, Q. 96, Art 2, ad 2.
24 Quadragesimo Anno, 25.
25 Quadragesimo Anno, 132.
26 Quadragesimo Anno, 133.
27 For more on the Austrian question, please see Appendix III.
28 Quadragesimo Anno, 133.
29 Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, v.
30 II, i, Q. 30, Art. 4.
31 I don't have a copy of his book. It is — sadly or fortunately, depending upon your perspective — out of print and nearly impossible to find.
32 "Now the seller who offers goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the buyer--loss, if, by reason of this defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the price on that account--danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred" (Summa Theolociga, II, ii, Q. 77, Art 3).
33 Chapter and verse from their works are as follows: St. Bernardine, Opera Omnia, vol III, p. 250, quoted by Amintore Fanfani, Le Origini dello Spirito Capitalistico in Italia, and St, Antoninus, Summa Moralis, pars iii., 8, 3, iv; and pars ii, I, 16, ii, quoted by Bede Jarret, Social Theories of the Middle Ages.

©Seattle Catholic
November 3, 2002

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