Showing posts with label catholic church. Show all posts
Showing posts with label catholic church. Show all posts

Friday, January 25, 2008

Better Red than Roman

by Emanuel Valenza



"The history of all hitherto existing society," opine Marx and Engels in the most quoted line from The Communist Manifesto, "is the history of class struggles," In the past antagonism existed between "freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, (and) guild-master and journeyman." Now the fundamental conflict is between the "bourgeoisie and proletariat." They conclude that "oppressor and oppressed (stand) in constant opposition to one another."1

Hostility between the bourgeoisie (capitalists who own the means of production) and the proletariat (laborers) is, according to Marx, inevitable because their goals are incompatible: owners seek profits and laborers desire higher wages. Because Marx believed that in any economic transaction there is a winner and loser—in other words, both parties cannot benefit from an exchange—profits are for the most part at the expense of wages, and vice versa. As Marx expresses it, "in proportion as capital accumulates, the lot of the laborer, be his payment high or low, must grow worse."2

The "class struggle" therefore is intrinsic to capitalism. Revolution is unavoidable as the proletariat eventually unites to overthrow their exploiters, the capitalists. Capitalism, the ineluctable successor to Feudalism, gives way, through revolutionary or dialectical change, to Socialism, which in turn inexorably leads to Communism. Lenin writes in State and Revolution: "Only the proletariat—by virtue of the economic role it plays in large-scale production—is capable of being the leader of all the laboring and exploited masses, whom the bourgeoisie exploits ... (and) who are incapable of waging an independent struggle for their emanicipation."3

He adds: "The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the dictatorship of the proletariat."4

In theory, therefore, wherever Communists come to power rule is exercised by the dictatorship of the proletariat. But we know from experience the Communist Party governs. Stalin explains in The Foundations of Leninism "No army at war can dispense with an experienced General Staff if it does not want to be doomed to defeat. Is it not clear the proletariat can still less dispense with such a General Staff if it does not want to allow itself to be devoured by its mortal enemies? But where is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of the proletariat can serve as this General Staff. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff.

The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat."5

The dictatorship of the proletariat, with the Communist Party at the helm, will transform the world into Utopia. Lin Shoo-Chi in his book, "How to be a Good Communist," describes this earthly paradise:

"In such a world there will be no exploiters, oppressors ... darkness, ignorance, backwardness, etc. (A)All human beings will become unselfish and intelligent Communists with a high level of culture and technique. The spirit of mutual assistance and mutual love will prevail among mankind.... Such a society will, of course, be the best, the most beautiful and the most advanced society in the history of mankind."6

According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the end—World Communism—justifies the means. A statement is true and an act is good if they promote the proletarian revolution. Conversely, a statement is false and an act is evil if the revolution is not benefited. Lenin writes:

"In what sense do we repudiate ethics and morality? In the sense that they were preached by the bourgeoisie, who declared that ethics were God's commandments. We, of course, say that we do not believe in God....We repudiate all morality that is taken outside of human, class concepts.... We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."7

As the General Staff of the proletariat, the Party determines what is true and good, or what is good for the revolution. This entails nothing less than interpreting each and every event in conformity with Marxist-Leninist categories. History is used, in the words of Herbert Schlossberg, as a "polemical devise."8 Or, as Frank S. Meyer puts it, the Communist intellect "is totally at the service of a single and compelling idea, made incarnate in the Communist Party: the concept of History as an inexorable god whose ways are revealed 'scientifically' through the doctrine and method of Marxism-Leninism. "9

History as a Polemical Device: The Spanish Civil War

Even though any number of examples could be cited to prove that history is used as a polemical device by Communists, the Spanish Civil War is especially worthy of study for several reasons: 1) The propaganda campaign of Communists has been so successful that scholars continue to write books and articles whitewashing the Socialist-Communist tyranny while comparing Franco to Hitler. "No episode of the '30's," writes Paul Johnson, "has been more lied about than this one."10 2) A strong anti-Catholic bias is one reason why Franco has been lambasted by historians. His crime? He was a Catholic who defended Catholic Spain from, in his words, "Socialism, Communism and other formulae which attack civilization to replace it with barbarism."11 3) The Spanish Civil War is representative of how Communists view the Church, namely as their "chief object of hatred."12

Typical of the books on the War is Paul Preston's "The Spanish Civil War" (N.Y. Grove Press, Inc., 1986). It is pure Communist propaganda. The Loyalists (the Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists) are portrayed as the embodiment of everything that is true and good.

On the other hand, Franco and his supporters, the Nationalists—so-called because "they stressed national values, and ... the cry 'Viva Espana!' was used among them"13—are considered the most vile of people.

In the Introduction Preston writes that his book is "interpretative rather than descriptive."14 He is correct: description is shunned because it precludes a favorable Communist interpretation. Some examples:

"It is a central theme of this book," writes Preston, "that the Civil War was the culmination of uneven struggles between the forces of reform and reaction...."15 of course, the "reformers" are the Communist and pro-Communist forces who "represent" the Spanish workers ("the oppressed"). The "reactionaries" are the "reactionary landholders, industrialists, and bankers"16 who used the Army "above all to defend their social and economic interests."17 They are "the oppressors."

The Real Cause: Leftist Despotism

Agitprop aside, the War was the culmination of a Catholic country's outrage against Leftist-Socialist policies and actions; and a split within the Socialist Party itself.

Consider:

After King Alfonso XIII was forced to leave Spain in 1931, an election held in June was won by the Left. The so-called "Second Republic" proceeded to disestablish Catholicism as the official religion of Spain. Moreover: 1) No State payments to the clergy and religious orders were permitted; 2) religious orders requiring a vow of obedience to an authority other than the State were evaporated; 3) Church property and education were nationalized; and 4) members of religious orders could not hold jobs in industry, commerce, and education.18

In addition, the pernicious Law for the Defense of the Republic was used by the Socialists the same way the Soviets employ the label "Anti-Soviet activity". Constitutional guarantees are on paper only.19

Legislative Tyranny translated into anarchy. "The birth of the Republic," observes Erik von Kuehnett-Leddihn, "was marred by endless acts of mob violence, by the burning of churches and monasteries, by endless strikes, by outbreaks of brigandage and a rapid decline of general security."20

Spain decided it is better to be dead than Red. The Spanish Civil War—"The Crusade"—began July 18, 1936.

Manuel Azana, Republican Minister of War and author of the Law for the Defense of the Republic, enjoyed all this violence. He declared, "all the convents in Madrid are not worth the life of one Republican."21

When the "Popular Front" won a narrow electoral victory in 1936, Azana was again the leader of the Socialist Party. Because the Party couldn't (wouldn't ?) control barbarous acts of the militant Left-republicans, socialists, anarchists, and Communists—the story was much the same as in 1931. During the first four months of Popular Front rule, the following atrocities occurred: 160 churches burned (arsonists attempted to burn another 284 buildings, 251 of them churches); 269 (mainly) political murders; 1,287 instances of assault; 113 "general strikes"; 228 partial strikes; and 10 newspaper offices plundered.22

With the Socialist Party leaning closer and closer to Communism, and anarchy in the streets, Catholic Spain decided it is better to be dead than Red. The Spanish Civil War—"The Crusade"—began July 18, 1936.

"Mistakes Were Made"

None of the Socialist-Communist savagery, whether done before or during the War, is mentioned by Preston. The Nationalists, in his eyes, had a monopoly on tragedy. Consider: a caption on the top of page 3 reads: "Death and destruction were the inevitable companions of (Franco's) military conquest." "Guernica," (a town in Northern Spain destroyed by the Luftwaffe fighting for Franco), "was the first total destruction of an undefended target by aerial bombardment."23 And we read much about the "Falangist terror squads."

What about Leftist barbarism? Preston's "harshest" statement is, " While mistakes were made, the Spanish Republic was an attempt to provide a better way of life for the humble members of a repressive society."24 Mistakes? Why is it that anti-Communist forces are called "terror squads", but the most vile of acts, if done in the name of a "better society," are "mistakes"? Ponder some of the "errors" Republicans were guilty of during the War:

20% of the bishops were murdered (11 out of 55) 12% of the monks were slaughtered (2,400 out of 20,000) 13% of the priests slain (4,550 out of 35,000).

Some 283 nuns murdered.25 The defilement of cemeteries," writes Erik von Kuehnett-Leddihn, "was practiced as an exquisite act."26

"(A) favorite sport in Barcelona during the Civil War," observes Frederick Wilhelmsen, "consisted in mounting machine-guns in the portals of churches and spraying the Tabernacle of the Altar. Disinterring dead nuns and violating them publicly ran a close second." 27

Erik von Kuehnett-Leddihn quotes Salvador de Madareaga: "(T)he mere fact of being a priest was tantamount to a capital sentence, and the fact that no Catholic worship was allowed at all till the end of the War or very nearly, and that churches and cathedrals were used as markets and thoroughfares for animal-driven vehicles cannot be disputed."28

In short, the Socialist-Communist faction "persecuted the Church with far greater savagery than even the Russian Communists (of 1917) did," to quote Erik von Kuehnett-Leddihn.29 As long as Communism exists, it will persecute the Church. "There can be nothing more abominable," wrote Lenin, "than religion." 30

Means To An End

Preston not only fails to mention these tragic states of affairs, he contends that they existed only in the minds of right-wing reporters. Catholics and members of the middle class supported Franco, he writes, because they "were appalled by the view of Republican disorder and anti-clericalism generated by the rightest press."31 (My emphasis).

But even if he were to acknowledge these atrocities, Preston would no doubt affirm they are necessary in order to build a Communist Utopia. He quotes with approval Buenaventura Durniti, the anarchist leader of the Republicans: "We are not afraid of ruins, we are going to inherit the earth. The bourgeoisie may blast and ruin their world before they leave the stage of history. But we carry a new world in our hearts."32 Preston himself writes, "During the Spanish Civil War...the struggle...was still seen as merely the first step to building a new egalitarian world out of the depression."33

Franco: Another Hitler!

Franco is hated because he spoiled the party. Preston goes as far as to compare him to Hitler: "(Republican) Spain was the last bulwark against the horrors of Hitlerism."34 (Preston does not give the "horrors of Stalinism" a second thought). Because Hitler supported Franco, Preston apparently thinks it is a case of "birds of a feather flock together". How absurd. Franco was a God-fearing man, not a son of Satan, as the following indicates: Nationalist troops dipped regimental banners into the sea, then had them blessed by a priest.35

At St. Barbara's Church, on Palm Sunday, the day after the Madrid Victory Parade, Franco and his family assisted at a Mass in which he dedicated the Nationalist Victory to God. The celebrant was Cardinal Goma, Primate of Spain.36

Franco reestablished the Church and returned property to the religious orders. Religious education was reintroduced, and the cemeteries were returned to ecclesiastical jurisdiction.37

Franco was buried behind the main altar of the basilica of the Valley of the Fallen, under a huge cross which is three times the size of the Statue of Liberty.38

Preston's Goal: Objectivity

Because he follows the Party line, and the Party line is the truth, Preston insists that The Spanish Civil War is a model of sound scholarship. His purpose was to "find a perfect balance between both sides."39 Topping his book off with a dedication to the International Brigades (Communist armies which infiltrated Spain to fight for the Loyalists), Preston is quite pleased with the result: "With such a team of friends to help, it seems astonishing that any book could still have shortcomings."40

Conclusion

Preston avers that the Republicans were "trying to drag Spain into the 20th century."41 This is another way of saying the Republicans wanted a Communisit Spain. For the 20th century is the century of Communism: half the globe is enslaved by it. In a war which lasted nearly three years, and cost one million lives, Catholic Spain said, "We rather be Roman than Red." She was practically alone in this assertion. As Frederick Wilhelmsen has written, "Franco won and then he held the line against the whole world."42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes

1. Essential Works of Marxism, ed. Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1961(1963), pp.13-14.

2. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1919), pp.708-709. Cited in Thomas Sowell, Marxism: Philosophy and Economics (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1985), p.140.

3. Mendel, op.cit, p.119.

4. Ibid, p.127.

5. Ibid, pp.283-284.

6. Cited in Fred Schwarz, You Can Trust the Communists to be Communists (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p.30.

7. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth League," (Speech delivered at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Youth Communist League, Oct. 2, 1920), in Selected Works (New York: International Publishers), 1943), Vol.IX, pp.474, 475, 477. Cited in Vincent P. Miceli, S.J., The Gods of Atheism (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971(1975), p.109.

8. Herbert Schlossberg, Idols For Destruction (Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1983), pp.19-20.

9. Frank S. Meyer, The Moulding of Communists (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961) p.16.

10. Paul Johnson, Modern Times (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1983), p.326.

11. Ibid, p.323.

12. Ibid, p.326.

13. Erik von Kuehnett-Leddihn, Leftism (N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974), p.265.

14. Preston, p.VII

15. Preston, p.9.

16. Preston, p.19.

17. Preston, p.24.

18. Article "Spain," Encyclopedia Brittannica, Inc., Vol.21, 1963, p.136.

19. Ibid, p.137.

20. Erik von Kuehnett-Leddihn, p.264.

21. Preston, p.23.

22. Paul Johnson, p.326. cf also Encyclopedia Brittannica, p.138.

23. Preston, p.4.

24. Ibid, p.VII.

25. Modern Times, p.327.

26. Leftism, p.260.

27. Frederick Wilhelmsen, "Adios: Francisco Franco", reprinted in his Citizen of Rome (La Salle, Ill.: Sherwood Sugden & Company, 1979) p.231.

28. Leftism, p.547 & 78.

29. Ibid, p.269.

30. Quoted in Modem Times, p.50.

31. Preston, p.2.

32. Ibid, p.4.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Preston, p.153.

36. Ibid, p.174.

37. Encyclopedia Brittannica, op.cit, p.140.

38. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., pp.222, 233.

39. Preston, p.VII

40. Ibid.

41. Preston, p.4.

42. Wilhelmsen, p.223.


The Angelus

Read more...

Monday, January 15, 2007

Catholic Action - An Alternate View

by John Sharpe



In a recent article featured in The Remnant, Mr. Anger and a colleague have maintained that there is, circulating within some traditional Catholic circles, a false conception of Catholic Action. Insofar as part of Mr. Anger's thesis is substantiated by a hidden criticism of my organization, the Legion of St. Louis, I feel compelled to respond.

Mr. Anger covers a lot of ground in his article, but there are some common themes which we can identify in his critique. I wish to look in detail at three themes which are central to Mr. Anger's position.

Criticism 1: Catholics who like to speak of "action" and are energetic in proposing that Catholics focus on the Social Doctrine of the Church suffer from one or all of the following: the lack of a spiritual foundation for their activities, an insufficient emphasis on the supernatural, a failure to recognize that charity is the root of action, etc.

Insofar as any Catholic lacks charity, or lacks concern for his spiritual life, or tends to have confidence in his own merits and abilities without recognizing that those come solely from God, he is to be criticized. But the essence of Mr. Anger's thesis, generally, seems to be that Catholics who talk routinely about Social Action are obviously guilty of — or unintentionally suffer from — those defects. I submit to the reader that to assume so is flawed and inappropriate for a Catholic. This for several reasons:

(1) Judge not lest ye be judged. Mr. Anger's assumption is fundamentally judgmental: it passes judgment on the intentions of fellow Catholics, implying a judgment on the intentions of those who prefer to discuss action and are interested in finding an answer to the question, "What is to be done?" Mr. Anger's critique does not proceed according to this logic: "Mr. Jones never says his Rosary, he lets his children watch rated-R movies, he ignores the lives of the Saints, and constantly discusses armed insurrection." I would concede that such a hypothetical gentleman should be blamed; I wouldn't however concede that it should be the routine business of Catholics to seek out opportunities to pass judgments on our fellow Catholics' spiritual and personal lives. Rather Mr. Anger's line of argument seems to be that because some Catholics think that the problem — how can committed, convinced, sincere traditional Catholics affect their society and their temporal surroundings — is deserving of consideration, and because those Catholics are fond of pointing out how hard it is to save one's soul in a wholly anti-Catholic environment, they are by necessity lacking a Catholic conscience, and do not themselves possess a robust spiritual life. To so assume is unfair, unwarranted, and illogical.

The result of Mr. Anger's position would be to put all active-minded Catholic laymen in the position of having to broadcast, at every turn, how holy they are, how they remember that no action can succeed without a solid spiritual life, etc., etc. Such a mindset, applied to every other walk of life, would lead to absurdity. Can I go to work every day, in order to feed my family, without being accused of "activism" because I don't leave my families empty stomachs solely in God's hands? In order to avoid the accusation of "naturalism" or an ignorance of the supernatural, do I have to announce, on my way into my office or workshop, that "I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT MY WORKS AND ABILITIES ARE COMPLETELY GIFTS OF GOD, AND THAT I WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING WERE I NOT FILLED WITH CHARITY!" Such a notion is ridiculous, and it is also ridiculous to accuse those who prefer to take some action to stem the tide of our eroding civilization, of being essentially opposed to the working of God's supernatural Grace and Providence, simply because the action they propose is, in fact, active!

Jean Ousset points out, in a passage (which does not lend itself to criticism of these fabled "activists," and is therefore rarely cited) of his book Action, that God respects the causality of the world, and that He normally works not miracles but rather allows events to unfold according to the processes of history and time and human relations which He has established — a notion that demands that if we want results, after we have said our prayers, we must act.

Things have indeed gone so far that if the Revolution were to triumph tomorrow, its triumph would be merited. For two hundred and fifty years (reckoned from the foundation of Freemasonry in 1717) the Revolution's waves of assaults have followed one after another, tirelessly renewed, ever more ingenious, shrewd and efficacious. It can therefore be truly said that the Revolution has merited its conquest of the world. Its cadres have known how to fight and how to persist; how to expend their efforts obstinately — and also how to open their purses when necessary...

Far from manifesting a lack of divine justice, the constant progress of Subversion shows how God respects the causality of the world He has made, by not denying the normal fruit of their labours even to the impious. For if it is true, as Psalm III declares, that "the desire of sinners shall perish," it does not follow that their inescapable divine chastisement should be to the advantage of that army which has not fought, of those "Sons of Light" who have not shone, of the "good people" (as they think themselves) about whom Pius X has not hesitated to say that through their idleness and cowardice they are, more than all others, the sinews of Satan's reign.

While Mr. Anger accuses the Catholic "activists" of forgetting supernatural charity, of turning Catholic Action into an "alternative radicalism" which operates solely on the natural and political planes, I would point out to him that a completely different interpretation of the same facts is possible, and more rational. In his magnum opus, Fr. Denis Fahey quotes a famous passage from Cardinal Journet; this passage explains both the beginning and the end of the motivation behind our discussion of action for the restoration of Christendom:

When the organization of the world is out of harmony with the supernatural end of man, scarcely anybody except the saints and martyrs can avoid mortal sin and abide in charity. But when the organization of the world is adjusted to the demands of the Divine Life of souls, then thousands of Christians can live and die in the love of God. They are strong enough to accomplish their duty in the company of others and to perform acts of heroic virtue at certain exceptional moments, but they would have been too weak to breast the frightful anti-supernatural current of a perverted naturalistic world. Charity, then, urges us to strive for the restoration of a Christian temporal order (emphasis mine).


(2) Action vs. prayer. Mr. Anger's position seems to be based upon a presumed dichotomy between action and contemplation. The assumption seems to be that to discuss action is to devalue prayer. That to suggest action is to discourage prayer. That to emphasize the need for action is to implicitly de-emphasize the need for prayer. Such an implication is also illogical, unfair, and unprovable.

Many of my friends and colleagues, who are fond of discussing a Catholic's role in the social order, routinely refer to the fact that a life of grace and spirituality should flower into action, that contemplation should lead to a practical application of the truth that one possesses. My position, and the position of those who I know who advocate Catholic Action, is the following: to suggest otherwise — to maintain that discussions of action are inherently anti-spiritual, and to conceive of a robust and healthy Faith which is not displayed and incarnated in action in the physical, temporal, socio-political world of daily life — is to condemn Catholics to a religious schizophrenia: it is to demand that Catholics make a special effort to avoid discussions of applying their Faith to the temporal order. Such an implication is, obviously, unhistorical and contrary to the teaching of the Church and the constant practice of Her faithful.1

(3) The operation of charity. Mr. Anger's position is perhaps a root of his misuse of the little word "by." He says, in the first paragraph of his article, that works of Catholic Action in the temporal order are accomplished by supernatural charity. The Thomistic position, the common-sense position, is, of course, that all actions properly performed by a Catholic are motivated and informed by charity, insofar as all actions are supposed to conduce ultimately to man's achievement of his last end, which is the Vision of God (Summa Theologica, II, ii, Q 23, Art. 7). So any time I perform any action which is moral, the action approaches perfection insofar as it is a means to my ultimate end, which is the attainment of Heaven. Thus my actions are inspired by, or motivated by, or, as St. Thomas puts it (II, ii, Q. 23, Art. 8) informed by charity; for this reason does he call charity the form of the virtues. But by suggesting that the works of Catholic Action are accomplished by supernatural charity, implying almost that charity itself is an action, Mr. Anger seems to suggest that works which are directly supernatural or have a strictly supernatural aim (such as prayer, fasting, sacrifice, etc., which have as their direct aim the sanctification of souls, rather than temporal activity which pursues man's last end indirectly) are the real or essential works of Catholic Action. Thus those who emphasize that Catholic Action is composed, principally, of social or temporal activities are somehow wrong and guilty of putting the cart before the horse.

This error is a significant one. Not only does it provide the basis for his implication that those who talk of action are anti-spiritual and misconstrue Catholic Action, but it seems to miss the entire point of the Church's Social doctrine, which we will review in brief.

Catholics like myself who are concerned with what Catholic laymen can do to salvage and restore the temporal order are motivated by a desire to help the temporal order serve the purpose for which it was ordained. Few of us are called to the cloistered religious life; most of us work out our salvation in the world, and our chances of attaining Heaven are affected greatly by what kind of world it is. This is Cardinal Journet's point. It is also Pius XI's point when he says that "...it is not rash by any means to say that the whole scheme of social and economic life is now such as to put in the way of vast numbers of mankind most serious obstacles which prevent them from caring for the one thing necessary; namely, their eternal salvation" (Quadragesimo Anno, 130). This follows from the fact that the temporal order was ordained by God as the milieu, ambience, or forum in which the majority of men are to work out their salvation. The Social Reign of Christ and the indirect authority of the Church over temporal affairs are based wholly upon this idea. St. Thomas lays out the fundamentals as follows:

Since the beatitude of heaven is the end of that virtuous life which we live at present, it pertains to the king's office to promote the good life of the multitude in such a way as to make it suitable for the attainment of heavenly happiness, that is to say he should command those things which lead to the happiness of Heaven and, as far as possible, forbid the contrary (On Kingship, 115).


This was repeated some 600 years later by Pope Leo XIII:

...civil society, established for the common welfare, should not only safeguard the well-being of the community, but have also at heart the interests of its individual members, in such mode as not in any way to hinder, but in every manner to render as easy as may be, the possession of that highest and unchangeable good for which all should seek.2


Therefore, the preoccupation that some Catholics have (myself included) regarding the nature and makeup of the social order is wholly rational and defensible. And to propose to remedy the situation by an efficacious application of the Church's Social Doctrine, through the concerted efforts of men correctly formed with the Church's Teaching on politics, economics, and society, seems not anti-supernatural, but rather overwhelmingly supernatural, since it implies a willingness to labor and to sacrifice so that all of us may more securely proceed to our eternal destiny. Such, at any rate, is the teaching of the Church.

(4) The two swords. Lastly, Mr. Anger's suggestion that the "activists" are necessarily anti- (or insufficiently) supernatural or spiritual seems to violate a principle which he expresses elsewhere in his article: the necessity of distinguishing between the spiritual and temporal powers. Those who take it upon themselves to discuss with other laymen the need for study and action in the area of the Social Doctrine are rightly reminded that they should nourish and encourage robust spiritual lives; consciousness of that spiritual duty, however, does not make them retreat-masters. The avoidance of dishing out volumes spiritual advice by those who propose social and cultural action seems to me to be a sign of wisdom: an understanding that there is a whole class of individuals more properly equipped and divinely appointed to do just that: the clerics. Failure to lecture one's fellow laymen on the spiritual life — barring the admitted usefulness of casual and informal discussions, periodic "reminders," and clear statements of understanding that the spiritual life is essential — can hardly be a smoking gun which reveals a hidden desire to spread a heretical activism and encourage ignorance of the spiritual life. It is, rather, a display of a proper respect for the division of the two powers, temporal and spiritual, and a wholly appropriate humility in not nit-picking the details of a fellow layman's personal habits by which he strives to save his soul.

To summarize: it is logical to contemplate the use of temporal means to achieve a temporal end. If we are hungry, we eat, not pray. We pray before we eat, just like we should pray before going into a battle of any kind (intellectual, physical, etc.). But to suggest that going into battle is anti-spiritual or anti-supernatural because it is not only supernatural is as ridiculous as suggesting that eating is anti-supernatural because it is not wholly spiritual. One may be permitted to wonder what degree of spirituality need be on display to satisfy the critics that Catholics interested in action do not therefore despise prayer ("O God, I give thee thanks that I am not as the rest of men..." St. Luke, xviii:2).

Criticism 2. People who demand that Catholics rouse themselves to action are simply seeking an "alternative radicalism" and an outlet for shady or inappropriate political activities, motivated by an "anti-government" spirit.

Under this criticism come two points which should be tackled separately: (1) the "activists" criticize the modern world too much, and dwell to heavily on its evils (which are always present in every era anyway), and thus they (2) tend to develop an anti-government mentality.

(1) The evils of the modern world. It seems rather meaningless to suggest that there is evil in every era of history, due to original sin, and that we therefore shouldn't get excited about it. Firstly, this omits the crucial point, which as we noted above is the essence of the Church's Social Doctrine, that the shape of society has a large bearing on man's ability to concern himself with saving his soul. Insofar as evil has always been in the world, since the Fall, it is not correct (by any means) to say that the social order has always, to more or less the same degree, condoned and permitted this evil. Leo XIII taught quite the contrary:

There was once a time when States were governed by the philosophy of the Gospel. Then it was that the power and divine virtue of Christian wisdom had diffused itself throughout the laws, institutions, and morals of the people, permeating all ranks and relations of civil society. Then, too, the religion instituted by Jesus Christ, established firmly in befitting dignity, flourished everywhere, by the favor of princes and the legitimate protection of magistrates; and Church and State were happily united in concord and friendly interchange of good offices. The State, constituted in this wise, bore fruits important beyond all expectation, whose remembrance is still, and always will be, in renown, witnessed to as they are by countless proofs which can never be blotted out or ever obscured by any craft of any enemies.3


Now, we may be able to debate, amicably and constructively, what means are best instituted to restore society to such a condition, but to suggest that the Social Doctrine is not in more vital need of implementation today then in times past is to state an untruth. Yes, Archbishop Levebvre did remind us we can err in the pursuit of virtue; and those errors should be avoided like every other error. But this same Archbishop wrote an entire book lamenting the social and public dethronement of Christ the King, in which he said that "Our Lord wants souls to be saved, doubtless indirectly, but effectively, through a Christian civil society, fully submissive to the Gospel, which lends itself to His redeeming design, which will be the temporal instrument for this." 4 No doubt Cardinal Pie, the 19th-century Bishop of Poitiers and anti-liberal crusader, who called the dethronement of Christ a crime against which "we should never cease to protest," would have objected to the notion that we should tone-down our objection to the modern world's apostasy and its essential incompatibility with the Faith.

I am all in favor of keeping our denunciations rational, balanced, and tactful. But I know of no advocate of an "active" (as opposed to one strictly "spiritual") Catholic Action that would object to those limitations. Perhaps where I differ with Mr. Anger is in my assessment that still today, within the ranks of traditional Catholicism, I am apt to run into any number of people who seem to think that having a Mass to attend, food to eat, and a "9 to 5" job, means that, all in all, things are great. Not that those aren't things to be grateful for. By all means they are. But such a mentality — with which it is certainly possible to use the Faith and the sacraments to struggle towards Heaven — tends to encourage a Catholic schizophrenia which separates the religious and personal life that one can eke out at home, from the public and social life that one is forced to live outside it. We "activists" are accused of wanting to isolate ourselves from society, of wanting to adopt a "survivalist" mentality, and yet I can imagine no mindset which is better calculated to produce disembodied Catholics, which are cut off from the realities of the world, than that which insists on a naïve "focus on the positive" kind of attitude. Because almost every aspect of society with which we come into contact on a day to day basis is radically out of order in light of the Divine Plan, and is almost incomprehensible to a Catholic absent a serious study of both "what's wrong with the world" and what would make it right. I can imagine no better way to fail in preparing our children to eventually face, understand, and react to the realities of a world outside the Catholic home which is anti-Catholic, perverse, and radically incompatible with the Christian notion of society, than to discourage a critical and honest assessment of our modern society.

Too extreme? Leo XIII called the rejection of Christ after having known Him, a crime that was both "foul" and "insane" (Tametsi, 3). The depravity of a world that had as a whole rejected Christ was even in his day well known by Catholics, though he didn't hesitate to say that the fact was "not sufficiently realized or thought about" (3). Nor did he hesitate to paint modern governments as "deceitful imitations" of government when they ignored God while managing affairs of state:

If, then, a political government strives after external advantages only, and the achievement of a cultured and prosperous life; if, in administering public affairs, it is wont to put God aside, and show no solicitude for the upholding of moral law, it deflects woefully from its right course and from the injunctions of nature; nor should it be accounted as a society or a community of men, but only as the deceitful imitation or appearance of a society (Sapientia Christianae (1890), 2).


Within traditional Catholic circles, one can find apologists for Austrian (read liberal) economics, enemies of the widespread distribution of property, apologists for the U.S. government's lawless "war on terror," and a host of others who, no doubt with the best of intentions, defend positions, behaviors, and aspects of the modern world which are indefensible when judged against, to use Ousset's phrase, the natural and Christian law. All of these things are not only contrary to the temporal common good of modern nations, but they also militate against the spirit which should prevail within society — that spirit which, as we have noted, is supposed to be a help toward salvation. Modern capitalism tells the citizen that the purpose of life is profit; it ensures that man remains a perpetual employee, rather than helping him to become an owner, which would allow him to flourish not as a robot but as a laborer imbued with the Catholic spirit of work. The foreign policy of the most powerful government in the world is without scruple in its willingness to kill and maim to maintain that system along with the corresponding liberal ideology. Is it really heretical "naturalism" or "activism" which leads some Catholics to denounce vigorously the social manifestation of intellectual errors which contravene the natural law and oppose the tenets of the Faith — errors which Pius XI referred to as "social and juridical modernism," and which he condemned "no less decidedly" than religious modernism?

The anti-liberal crusaders of the late 19th-century didn't seem to have many scruples about denouncing error in the most vigorous of terms — and it is well-known that many of the chief errors of those days were in fact the same socio-political misconceptions that we moderns suffer from. Here is one representative voice:

There is then no sin against charity in calling evil evil, its authors, abettors and disciples bad; all its acts, words and writings iniquitous, wicked, malicious...

If the propagation of good and the necessity of combating evil require the employment of terms somewhat harsh against error and its supporters, this usage is certainly not against charity. This is a corollary or consequence of the principle we have just demonstrated. We must render evil odious and detestable. We cannot attain this result without pointing out the dangers of evil, without showing how and why it is odious, detestable and contemptible. Christian oratory of all ages has ever employed the most vigorous and emphatic rhetoric in the arsenal of human speech against impiety. In the writings of the great athletes of Christianity the usage of irony, imprecation, execration and of the most crushing epithets is continual. Hence the only law is the opportunity and the truth.

But there is another justification for such an usage. Popular propagation and apologetics cannot preserve elegant and constrained academic forms. In order to convince the people we must speak to their heart and their imagination which can only be touched by ardent, brilliant, and impassioned language. To be impassioned is not to be reprehensible, when our heat is the holy ardor of truth.

...St. John the Baptist calls the Pharisees "race of vipers," Jesus Christ, our Divine Savior, hurls at them the epithets "hypocrites, whitened sepulchers, a perverse and adulterous generation" without thinking for this reason that He sullies the sanctity of His benevolent speech. St. Paul criticizes the schismatic Cretins (110) as "always liars, evil beasts, slothful bellies." The same apostle calls Elymas the magician "seducer, full of guile and deceit, child of the Devil, enemy of all justice."

...What shall we say of St. John Chrysostom? His famous invective against Eutropius is not comparable, in its personal (111) and aggressive character, to the cruel invectives of Cicero against Catiline and against Verres! The gentle St. Bernard did not honey his words when he attacked the enemies of the faith. Addressing Arnold of Brescia, the great Liberal agitator of his times, he calls him in all his letters "seducer, vase of injuries, scorpion, cruel wolf."

The pacific St. Thomas of Aquinas forgets the calm of his cold syllogisms when he hurls his violent apostrophe against William of St. Amour and his disciples: "Enemies of God," he cries out, "ministers of the Devil, members of AntiChrist, ignorami, perverts, reprobates!" Never did the illustrious Louis Veuillot speak so boldly.


Thus speaks the eminent Fr. Felix Sarda y Salvany, in Liberalism is a Sin, Chapter 20.

(2) The "anti-government" spirit. From the willingness of certain Catholics to remind their fellows of the evils of modern society, and of how and where that society fails to live up to what the Church demands, supposedly follows a spirit of disobedience and lawlessness toward lawful authority: the dreaded "anti-government" spirit.

Evidence of this spirit is apparently found in the desire of some Catholics to isolate themselves from the mainstream, to more easily preserve their Faith and minimize the influence of anti-Catholic society. Fr. Sarda seems to think that this is not a bad idea: "The first thing to do in an infected country is to isolate oneself, and if this is not possible, take all sanitary precautions against the deadly germ. Spiritual health is always endangered whenever we come into contact with Liberalism, and infection is almost certain if we neglect those precautions which prudence suggests" (Chapter 17, Liberalism is a Sin). In this country of allegedly un-precedented personal freedoms, is it not licit and wholly allowable under positive law to buy a plot of land away from the immorality, the smog, and the cable TV of the modern suburbs? Are we to expect that the Amish will be massacred or rounded up for their refusal to play the "suburban" game? And if they were, would it be their own fault for not capitulating to WalMart and rock music? Such a "Flee to the Fields" may not be an approach that suits everyone, but insofar as everyone from Richard Weaver to Mgr. Williamson to Archbishop Levebvre to Fr. Fahey to Fr. Vincent McNabb and more have praised initiatives, either speculative or practical, to return the modern family to the land, what grounds is there for suspecting of subversion and rebellion the men who contemplate this as a possible course of action? Such a suspicion, I submit, is unfair, unfounded, and untenable.

A final point under this heading would be that the government in this country, as in so many others, falls so short of the ideal on even the natural order, let alone the supernatural, that some degree of "angst," "distrust," "dissatisfaction," and "suspicion" would seem to be wholly justified. It is natural for a man, who is vir — a real man insofar as he is virtuous, to be aroused to anger at the sight of injustice. Such anger in no way implies a refusal to obey legitimate authority, or a lack of prudence in cooperating with that authority even when it is illegitimate. As Cardinal Ottaviani pointed out, the liveliness of Christians is best measured by the intensity of their reaction to injustice:

The frequency and power of crime have blunted Christian sensibility, even alas! among Christians. Not only as men, but as Christians, they do not react, do not leap to their feet. How can they feel themselves to be Christians if they are insensitive to the wounds which are being inflicted on Christianity. Life shows its existence by the sensation of pain, by the vivacity (an expressive word) by which it reacts to a wound, by the promptness and vigor of the reaction. In the midst of rottenness and decomposition there is no reaction (quoted by Ousset in Action).

To demand that Catholics turn off their natural and healthy instincts to oppose and abhor injustice when they see it, their desire to root out corruption and abuse from the civil order, and to replace it — lawfully and legitimately — with justice, mercy, and competence is to once again condemn them to a fantasy land of the utopian Catholic home full of a potential army of recruits for Catholic Action who are potentially doomed to entering the public sphere without a coherent vision both of what they want, and of what they don't want.

Criticism 3: Catholic Action is not political.

The last of Mr. Anger's major objections to an "active" Catholic Action seems to be based on the notion that Catholic Action should not seek to achieve its aims based on temporal, political activity, but on a supernatural or spiritual activity. This criticism is not altogether clear, however, for it is never stated quite as simply as we have summarized it. There are several possible interpretations, all of which warrant responses.

(1) A lack of supernatural perspective? If his complaint is that the active-minded men who are attracted to Catholic Action for its potential to engage and transform the social order tend to see things with a strictly temporal or natural — as opposed to spiritual or supernatural — viewpoint, then the answer is that if this were true, it is a valid point; but I don't think that it is true. All serious Catholics know that life is a mysterious mixture of Divine Providence and free will, and that Divine Providence will not magically drop into our laps what we might have accomplished through His power by using our free wills. Sr. Lucia knew that: "Prayer does not dispense from action." St. Pius X knew it, for he deplored the "cowardice and weakness of good men." 5 Jean Ousset knew it. Serious Catholics know, furthermore, as a matter of Faith, that whenever they do a good work, it is Christ that works through them, and God is responsible for having accomplished it. To accuse a Catholic of not believing that is to accuse him of heresy. That's an accusation which is not to be made lightly, and in this case I think it's an accusation that doesn't stick.

(2) Action in the temporal order. If the complaint is, rather, that some men believe that Catholic Action is essentially concerned with the implementation of the Social Doctrine of the Church in society through action in the temporal order, then I would personally plead guilty — maintaining meanwhile that such a charge is really no charge at all. For while in a general way Catholic Action "does not exclude anything, in any manner, direct or indirect, which pertains to the divine mission of the Church," 6 it is more accurate to define Catholic Action as St. Pius X himself has defined it:

...you clearly see, Venerable Brethren, the services rendered to the Church by those chosen bands of Catholics who aim to unite all their forces in combating anti Christian civilization by every just and lawful means. They use every means in repairing the serious disorders caused by it. They seek to restore Jesus Christ to the family, the school and society by re-establishing the principle that human authority represents the authority of God. They take to heart the interests of the people, especially those of the working and agricultural classes, not only by inculcating in the hearts of everybody a true religious spirit (the only true fount of consolation among the troubles of this life) but also by endeavoring to dry their tears, to alleviate their sufferings, and to improve their economic condition by wise measures. They strive, in a word, to make public laws conformable to justice and amend or suppress those which are not so. Finally, they defend and support in a true Catholic spirit the rights of God in all things and the no less sacred rights of the Church.


All these works, sustained and promoted chiefly by lay Catholics and whose form varies according to the needs of each country, constitute what is generally known by a distinctive and surely a very noble name: "Catholic Action," or the "Action of Catholics." 7

It should be obvious from the above that Catholic Action refers, in its specific sense, to the activities of the laity to shape society according to the dictates of the Faith — to the restoration of "Christian civilization in each and every one of the elements composing it;" 8 to making "public laws conformable to justice and amend[ing] or suppress[ing] those which are not so;" to "combating anti-Christian civilization by every just and lawful means."

A modern, orthodox cleric has defended this interpretation. In a conference on "Supplied Jurisdiction and Traditional Priests," 9 Mgr. Tissier de Mallerais has pointed out that works which are "a participation in the priestly ministry on the part of the laity" do not constitute "a movement of Catholic Action in the strict sense of the word." He goes on to say that "Catholic Action understood as a work of the laity in the temporal order, so as to bring about the reign of Christian social principles in the State...is this which St. Pius X strove especially to promote, and which can be called Catholic Action in the strict sense of the term" (emphasis mine).

Finally, it is worth noting in passing that Ousset's book Action, an authority on the subject of Catholic Action which Mr. Anger evidently recognizes, is essentially and only about action in the temporal order.

(3) The authority of the clergy. Related to Mr. Anger's notion of Catholic Action as an apostolate "fundamentally religious" is his reminder that the authority of the clergy over the action of the laity must not be considered as "insignificant" or "optional." True enough.

Though there can be no doubt that misconceptions of Catholic Action will lead to misconceptions of clerical authority. Those who fail to see Catholic Action the way Mr. Anger does (in the properly "spiritual" light), will no doubt merit the criticism that they do not sufficiently respect clerical authority. That a continuum of action and authority (i.e., spiritual vs. temporal action, corresponding to direct vs. indirect authority) exists is attested to by Mgr. Tissier de Mallerais: the more strictly "spiritual" an activity is, the more directly it falls under the direct supervision and control of the hierarchy; the more "temporal" it is, the more "tenuous" is the link with the clergy.10 But it is worth noting that the definitions above, given by both St. Pius X and the Bishop, clearly indicate that Catholic Action refers to the temporal activity of the laity to implement Christian Social Principles in the State. While the statement of Ousset that Mr. Anger cites is no doubt true — that the Christian layman has "an imperative duty to follow the teaching of the spiritual power of the Church," it is no less true that, again according to Ousset, "the priest's essential task is to teach sound doctrine, not to implement it."

The point is that if laymen share Mgr. Tissier's conviction that Catholic Action strictly speaking refers to the action of laymen to implement the Church's Social Doctrine in society, they are not to be condemned. Nor should they be condemned for holding a view that logically follows from that definition: that they should be left with a degree of freedom to develop programs for the implementation of that doctrine in the temporal order, subject of course to judgment of its conformity with Christian principles. For, as Bishop Guerry pointed out in his 1961 Social Doctrine of the Church:

Christians must apply themselves, under their own responsibility, to political, economic, and social analyses and draw their conclusions with a view to action. The social teaching of the Church is not a ready-made program which has only to be applied. Christians still have to work out a program of action which, while it refers to this doctrine, will imply ideas and applications which are the complete responsibilities of the laity.11


(4) Politics vs. parties. Mr. Anger correctly states that Catholic Action does not concern itself with party politics, but he seems to downplay the fact that it is concerned with fostering the temporal common good of the State according to Christian principles; to the restoration of "Christian civilization in each and every one of the elements composing it;" to "preparing men to act as good politicians, to work for the common good according to right principles." Accomplishing such a task demands that men become active politically, though such activity does not, obviously, imply that the Church will sanction this or that political party — this is what is meant by the notion "Catholic Action is not political." Pope Pius XI says this exactly in the passage that Mr. Anger also quoted, but including the sections that he left out:

Catholic Action is on a plane above and outside any political party. It does not intend to advance the political ideas of a party nor is it a political party. Catholics have nevertheless understood that this does not mean that they should take no interest in politics, when by politics is meant the common good in opposition to individual and particular goods...Catholic Action, while not engaging in party politics, aims at preparing men to act as good politicians, to work for the common good according to right principles...Thus, consequently, not only does Catholic Action not prevent individual Catholics from engaging in political action in order to promote the common welfare, but it imposes upon them the duty of so doing, for it obliges them to intervene in politics with a more enlightened conscience and a clearer grasp of the issues at stake (emphasis mine).12


Fr. Fahey makes the same point with his usual clarity:

Catholics must endeavor to assimilate and promote the realization of Catholic political and economic doctrine: that is the province of Catholic Action. But in order to bring about the realization of Catholic political teaching, they must nearly always enter into a political party and help to direct and guide it: in that they act on their own responsibility, except, of course, the Church commands Catholics to adopt a certain attitude in a political affair, because of a morally necessary connection with the good of souls.13



***
A personal digression — the Legion of St. Louis. Under the guise of making his point that Catholic Action is not political, Mr. Anger attacks a statement which occurs in the Vision statement of my Legion of St. Louis. I respond publicly to his criticism because he has at no time initiated a private correspondence on this issue which would have given me the opportunity to respond privately.

His issue is with my use, in the Legion's Vision statement, of the phrase "prudent yet real ideological and political war," a phrase which results from allegedly "blurry thinking" and "naïveté."

(1) The Legion does not claim to be an "officially sanctioned" organization of Catholic Action, so whether or not its statement of vision is consistent with the teaching of the Church on Catholic Action in the strict sense has little to do with whether or not Catholic men are permitted to join hands with us to fight the social and intellectual fight for a healthier, more Catholic society. Ousset's observations (in Action) on that point are germane, and are no doubt known to Mr. Anger given his familiarity with that excellent work:

What then is our sphere of action as lay people? What are our rights concerning action in the temporal sphere? Have we a right to engage in it without a "mandate," without being under the direction of the clergy?


The truth is that an ecclesiastical mandate is unnecessary to allow a layman to exercise a right, still less to accomplish an elementary duty of his life as a layman, such as to marry, bring up children, practice a profession, play his part as a citizen or serve his country in a Christian fashion. It would be quite monstrous to suggest that his being a Christian should result in the restriction of a person's freedom to exercise his rights and comply with his most elementary duties as a Christian.

If the Legion is "political" in Mr. Anger's eyes, that may make it "off-limits" for Catholics with his particular vision of Catholic Action; it would remain, however, a licit vehicle through which Catholics can take action in defense of what remains of Christian society.

(2) An examination of the facts reveals, however, that the Legion is very much organized in a way consistent with the teaching of the Church on Catholic Action. As we have noted, Catholic Action strictly speaking refers to the activities of the laity in the temporal order for the implementation of Catholic Social Doctrine. The Legion is political insofar as it works for an objective intimately connected with the temporal common good of the nation: "the permeation of society with the Faith, the molding of the Social Order according to Catholic Truth, and the reestablishment of temporal authority in its proper place in submission to, not triumph over, Our Lord" (from the Vision Statement). This aim is obviously consistent with Mgr. Tissier's notion of Catholic Action as "a work of the laity in the temporal order, so as to bring about the reign of Christian social principles in the State," and it falls under the goal which Fr. Fahey called "the province of Catholic Action": "to assimilate and promote the realization of Catholic political and economic doctrine."

If Mr. Anger took the term "politics" in the statement which he quoted ("prudent yet real ideological and political war") as a reference to partisan or party struggles, he must have missed (unintentionally, no doubt) the footnote which is printed with the Vision Statement, and which references the term "political" as follows: "(1) By 'political' we mean public and social, not participation in our modern two-party farce." So "political" is a simple adjective which indicates that our combat is for the social order, for the public good. Not political insofar as political means partisan or attached to a party. Mr. Anger obviously missed that fact.

(3) Mr. Anger also objects to my use of the term "ideological," as implying anti-Catholic and Revolutionary notions. The context in which such a phrase is used should dispel any doubt, but perhaps even more relevant is the fact that we use the word in the most common way for common Catholics. Webster's says that an "ideology" is "a systematic body of concepts, esp. about human life or culture" and "the integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a socio-political program." It cannot be denied that Catholics have a clear notion of the purpose of life on earth, along with a socio-political program to implement, in order to make society conform to that purpose. Thus it is that we refer to an "ideological" struggle, for our efforts are nothing other than to make the program of the Catholic Church, the complete and integral Divine Plan for Order, as Fr. Fahey called it, better known, more thoroughly understood, and more deeply appreciated by Catholics and men of good will, that it might ultimately rise over its "ideological opponents" and impart its character and tone to the organization of society.

(4) A final point. Insofar as priestly guidance is necessary, at least indirectly, for Catholics in Catholic Action, I merely point out that Mr. Anger has not the slightest idea what kind of clerical oversight the Legion possesses, and is grossly out of line in suggesting that we are "lacking priestly guidance." This is yet another hint of the tendency to be "judgmental" when it is hardly called for.

***
There are literally millions of Catholics who could today bring their Catholicism to bear on public life; that they don't do so is not a new but rather an old problem. It was a problem for the Bishop of Poitiers, who asked rhetorically, "What is the explanation of the fact that so much charity, so much activity, so much self-sacrifice are so ineffectual and produce so little fruit in regard to the amelioration of public affairs?" He answered his own question, lamenting that,

in regard to public affairs and social order, the faithful and, in too many cases, the priests of our generation have thought that even in a Christian country, a sort of neutral attitude towards the Catholic faith could be adopted, as if Our Lord Jesus Christ had never come or had disappeared from the world...


"If we have not succeeded," he continued, "in triumphing over the revolutionary spirit which makes us a spectacle for other peoples, the evil which is sapping our strength and leading us to the tomb is that while we have the faith in private we have accepted our share of national infidelity." 14

The saintly pope who so admired Cardinal Pie himself complained of "the easy-going weakness of Catholics" which was, he said, responsible for "all the vigor of Satan's reign," 15 making it likely that he would not have objected at all to the idea that Catholics "really need to know" the Social Doctrine, in spite of Mr. Anger's assumption to the contrary. At any rate, in 1945 Pius XII said that no one can ignore the Social Teachings without danger to Faith and Morals, and the French Hierarchy declared nine years later that "one of the gravest deficiencies of the present day is the underestimation or ignorance of the social teaching of the Church." 16

We would be hard pressed to say that things have improved since 1954. But things might, if, by God's grace, we not only believe our Faith and practice our Faith, but apply it, whole and entire, to the myriad of problems we see around us. I leave the reader with the entire inspiring passage (of which Mr. Anger gave us merely certain portions) from St. Pius X, in which he details the attributes and the spirit of the true Catholic crusader: a spirit necessary to overcome the numerous difficulties of a life of Catholic Action:

...one must have divine grace, and the apostle receives it only if he is united to Christ. Only when he has formed Jesus Christ in himself shall he more easily be able to restore Him to the family and society. Therefore, all who are called upon to direct or dedicate themselves to the Catholic cause, must be sound Catholics, firm in faith, solidly instructed in religious matters, truly submissive to the Church and especially to this supreme Apostolic See and the Vicar of Jesus Christ. They must be men of real piety, of manly virtue, and of a life so chaste and fearless that they will be a guiding example to all others. If they are not so formed it will be difficult to arouse others to do good and practically impossible to act with a good intention. The strength needed to persevere in continually bearing the weariness of every true apostolate will fail. The calumnies of enemies, the coldness and frightfully little cooperation of even good men, sometimes even the jealousy of friends and fellow workers (excusable, undoubtedly, on account of the weakness of human nature, but also harmful and a cause of discord, offense and quarrels) — all these will weaken the apostle who lacks divine grace. Only virtue, patient and firm and at the same time mild and tender, can remove or diminish these difficulties in such a way that the works undertaken by Catholic forces will not be compromised. The will of God, Saint Peter wrote the early Christians, is that by your good works you silence the foolish. "For such is the will of God, that by doing good you should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men."


©Seattle Catholic
December 13, 2002

Read more...

Opposing the Austrian Heresy

by Christopher Ferrara


I am privileged to introduce Dr. Peter Chojnowski's article "Corporation Christendom: The True School of Salamanca," which deftly exposes how the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, Sts. Bernadine of Siena and Antonino of Florence, and the late Spanish Scholastics on just prices and wages has been misrepresented by proponents of the so-called Austrian School of economics.

Dr. Chojnowski's article is an important first step in mounting a traditional Catholic response to the swelling ambitions of the Austrian school, whose two major divines, the deceased liberal Jewish thinkers Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard, wrote the foundational works of the Austrian movement: the massive tome Human Action (1949) by Mises, and the equally massive Man, Economy and State (1962) by Rothbard. These two books comprise the Old and New "Testament" of what amounts today to a cult of radical social and economic laissez faire, which, sad to say, claims a growing number of Catholic adherents.

A CULT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE

I do not use the phrase "swelling ambitions" or the word "cult" lightly. The Mises Institute, founded to preach a gospel of social and economic "liberty" to the world, boasts of the movement's success in near-messianic terms. As the Institute—headed by a Catholic, Lew Rockwell—recently declared:

We have been remarkably effective in building a global movement for liberty and its intellectual foundation. Today Austrians and libertarians form a cohesive movement the world over, united on principles, publishing as never before, and teaching the multitudes through every means available. For this reason, the Austrian School has been called the most coherent and active international intellectual movement since Marxism.1


The Mises Institute's tribute to Rothbard on the tenth anniversary of his death savors of a cultic dulia:

And so, to dear Murray, our friend and mentor, the vice president of the Mises Institute, the scholar who gave us guidance and the gentleman who showed us how to find joy in confronting the enemy and advancing truth, the staff and scholars of the Institute offer this tribute, alongside the millions who have been drawn to his ideas. May his works always be available to all who care to learn about liberty and do their part to fight for the cornerstone of civilization itself. May his legacy endure forever [!] and may we all become happy warriors for the cause of liberty.2


Heaven and earth may pass away, but Rothbard's words will not pass away.

WHAT KIND OF THOMIST IS THIS?

Rothbard befriended a number of prominent Catholics during his life, but evidently was converted by none of them. He professed to be a "neo-Thomist" because of his peculiar secularized notion of "natural rights" detached from any divine endowment. Rothbard (and other Austrians) attempted to pass off his version of natural rights as likewise sanctioned by the Spanish Scholastics, but of course no Scholastic philosopher ever held that there could be natural rights without a divine Obligor to give them the force of natural law, which is man's innate participation in the eternal law. There can be no rights without an obligor, nor law without a lawgiver. And if there is no divine Creator who endowed man with a fixed nature, what sense does it make to speak of human "nature" and "natural" rights in the first place? Rothbard's "scholarship" attributing to St. Thomas and Suarez the "absolute independence of natural law from the question of the existence of God…"3 was not only shoddy; it was nonsensical on its face.4

Rothbard's natural-right theory was limited to the (non-existent) "ownership" of one's own body and the ownership of private property attaching on first appropriation of unused resources.5 Since these were the only two natural rights Rothbard recognized as universally binding, he (like the strict utilitarian Mises) would limit the power of government to the protection of those rights only. Thus, he defined "freedom" as "the absence of invasion [his emphasis] by another man of any man's person or property."6

Based on his concepts of natural rights and freedom, whose deviance from Catholic teaching needs no demonstration, "dear Murray" advocated not only the legal right to abortion but also the right to sell one's children (i.e., to sell the ownership of parental rights), or, if one prefers, to let one's children starve to death. The latter "right," wrote Rothbard, "allows us to solve such vexing questions as: should a parent allow a deformed baby to die (e.g., by not feeding it)? The answer is, of course, yes…."7 Rothbard was certain, however, that "in a libertarian society, the existence of a free baby market will bring such 'neglect' down to a minimum."8 These views of "dear Murray" are enunciated in his Ethics of Liberty, which Mr. Rockwell promotes as part of "the core" and one of the ten "must haves" of Austrian literature.9

FREEING PRICES AND WAGES FROM MORALITY

In demonstrating that the Austrians have not accurately presented the Scholastic teaching on the just wage and the just price, Dr. Chojnowski has done much more than to make an academic point. As he points out, Mises (and, even more so, Rothbard) advocated a social order that negate[s] Christendom and every social, economic, and moral teaching of the Catholic Church [and] also renders "inoperative" the entire Classical moral and philosophical tradition.

Dr. Chojnowski is here referring to a fundamental truth of human existence affirmed by Western man from the time of the pagan philosophers to the great anti-liberal popes of the 19th and early 20th centuries: i.e., that man is ordered by his very nature to life in society under a common ruler and set of laws, and that this arrangement, called the State, is necessary not only for the maintenance of peace but also for the achievement of virtue, which means "becoming as like to God as it is possible for man to become."10 As Pope Leo XIII declared in Libertas, his monumental encyclical on the nature of human liberty:

Even the heathen philosophers clearly recognized this truth, especially they who held that the wise man alone is free; and by the term 'wise man' was meant, as is well known, the man trained to live in accordance with his nature, that is, in justice and virtue.11


The Misesian-Rothbardian system, going even beyond the French Revolutionaries and The Declaration of the Rights of Man, utterly rejects this concept of the State. As Rothbard wrote in Ethics of Liberty:

[T]he great failing of natural-law theory—from Plato and Aristotle to the Thomists and down to Leo Strauss and his followers in the present day—is to have been profoundly statist rather than individualist.


That is, the entire Western tradition is wrong and "dear Murray" is right. Following Rothbard, many (if not most) contemporary Austrians would not only limit the power of the State to the mere prevention of violence and theft (a la Mises), but would abolish the State altogether in favor of a Utopian "anarcho-capitalist" polity in which social order is maintained entirely by insurance companies 13 and other private contractual agencies. As the libertarian scholar Ralph Raico explains:

Contemporary Austrian economists, following in Mises's footsteps, have by and large adopted a more radical form of liberalism. At least one of them, Murray N. Rothbard…has gone even further in his anti-statism. It is to a large degree due to Rothbard's "libertarian scholarship and advocacy"…that Austrianism is associated in the minds of many with a defense of the free market and private property to the point of the very abolition of the state, and thus of the total triumph of civil society….14


Thus, Marxist and Austrian alike envision a withering away of the State, although they arrive at their dreamland from opposite sides: the one by way of abolishing private property, the other by exalting it to the summum bonum of politics (even if, as Rothbard allowed, "personal ethics" might have a higher aim in view).

Seen against this background, the Austrians' attempt to cast the Spanish Scholastics as proto-Austrians, an undertaking begun by Rothbard, is highly significant. The aim here is to persuade us that it is perfectly Catholic to believe that "the market price is the just price" without further moral inquiry, and that this is true always and everywhere, both as to wages and commodities. Of course, to accept this dictum is to reject the teaching of seven consecutive popes, both pre- and post-conciliar, who hold quite to the contrary on the question of just wages: Leo XIII, St. Pius X, Pius XI, Pius XII, John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II have all insisted on precisely the point that the "market wage" and the just wage are not morally equivalent, as an employer is bound in justice to pay, whenever conditions allow, a living wage sufficient for the ordinary support of a dependent worker and his family, no matter what "the market" supposedly dictates. As Pope Leo declared in Rerum Novarum (§63):

[T]here underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accept harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim offeree and injustice….


As the Austrians would have it, the Spanish Scholastics shared their theory that prices and wages arise from the sum total of subjective utility assessments by parties to exchanges (i.e., what each party thinks the good or service to be acquired or given up is worth in terms of serving needs or wants on his personal scale of values), rather than by such objective factors as cost plus reasonable profit, what is needed to maintain one's station in life, or the commonly estimated intrinsic value of a good. As Dr. Chojnowski shows, however, the Austrians' own writings admit (or at least inadvertently reveal) that the Scholastics did not teach this absolutist view. Rather, as the renowned traditional Catholic economist Heinrich Pesch, S.J., pointed out in Volume V of his encyclopedic treatise on economics, Lehrbuch der Nationalokonomie, the Scholastic teaching on the just price involved "a combination of 'subjective' and 'objective' factors, as these exert decisive influence on the price formation." These factors included not just subjective utility but also "the qualitative capacity of the goods for satisfying human wants," the "work and costs involved in producing and making the goods available," and, most damaging to the Austrian claim, "the general [objective] value estimation and the officially set price" in keeping with the common legal practice in medieval times of ceiling prices fixed by the prince, especially as to the necessities of life.15 Indeed, even on the question of wages the Spanish Scholastics were in general agreement with the later papal view that in the labor market "compulsion was possible due to disadvantage in bargaining power held by either employee or employer" and that "[c]ollusion associated with labor market combinations might require an impartial observer to establish the just wage, properly reinforced by legal rule"16—not exactly music to Austrian ears.

Why the Austrian insistence on an exclusive subjective utility theory and the resulting "free agreement" as the only criterion of justice in prices and wages? Why do the Austrians seriously defend Scrooge 17 and the practice of price-gouging desperate consumers during emergencies,18 when the voice of conscience in every reasonable man cries "outrageous" and "unfair"? The answer is that if there is no objective standard of a just price or wage, and if the just price or wage is—in every case, always and everywhere—simply the market price, then the market becomes totally "self-regulating" and thus immune from moral correction of its abuses by either the Church or public authority. If the just price is nothing more than the market price, then, conveniently enough, the market never fails to achieve justice so defined. This means that the market's marvelous "self-regulating" capacity can then be cited in favor of an entire "free market society" based on "the market principle," wherein human action in general is free from any "external" norm of justice imposed by law, save that which governs economic exchange: i.e., the absence of violence or theft. As Rothbard argued in a passage full of loaded terminology:

Every time a free, peaceful unit-act of exchange occurs, the market principle has been put into operation; every time a man coerces an exchange by the threat of violence , the hegemonic principle has been put to work. All the shadings of society are mixtures of these two primary elements. The more the market principle prevails in a society, therefore, the greater will be that society's freedom and its prosperity. The more the hegemonic principle abounds, the greater will be the extent of slavery and poverty….19


THE AUSTRIAN HERESY

The effort to "baptize" what has rightly been called (in a broad, non-canonical sense) "the Austrian heresy" would lead us only to a "purified" form of the same social order condemned by every pope from Pius VI through Pius XII. As faithful Catholics understand, however, Murray Rothbard had no idea what "freedom" means, nor any authority to teach the world about the nature of social liberty. The whole truth about social liberty is to be found only in the teaching of the Magisterium, a single paragraph of which contains more wisdom than the entire bloated corpus of Austrian political philosophy. As Pope Leo taught in Libertas Praestantissimum:

[T]he eternal law of God is the sole standard and rule of human liberty, not only in each individual man, but also in the community and civil society which men constitute when united. Therefore, the true liberty of human society does not consist in every man doing what he pleases, for this would simply end in turmoil and confusion, and bring on the overthrow of the State; but rather in this, that through the injunctions of the civil law all may more easily conform to the prescriptions of the eternal law….What has been said of the liberty of individuals is no less applicable to them when considered as bound together in civil society. For, what reason and the natural law do for individuals, human law, promulgated for their good, does for the citizens of States.20


Pope Leo here describes with marvelous concision the only concept of social liberty to which Catholics can adhere. Nor should we entertain the argument by certain Catholic Austrians that the Church's concept of social liberty is out of the question today, and that we must settle for an expedient compromise with "the facts." Speaking of precisely this sort of liberal Catholic, Pius XI declared:

Many believe in or claim that they believe in and hold fast to Catholic doctrine on such questions as social authority, the right of owning private property, on the relations between capital and labor, on the rights of the laboring man, on the relations between Church and State, religion and country…on the social rights of Jesus Christ, Who is the Creator, Redeemer, and Lord not only of individuals but of nations. In spite of these protestations, they speak, write, and, what is more, act as if it were not necessary any longer to follow, or that they did not remain still in full force, the teachings and solemn pronouncements which may be found in so many documents of the Holy See, and particularly in those written by Leo XIII, Pius X, and Benedict XV. There is a species of moral, legal, and social modernism which We condemn, no less decidedly than We condemn theological modernism.21


Finally, we can reply to these social modernists, who call for a compromise of the Catholic ideal, by citing against them Rothbard's own exhortation never to forsake a "radical idealism":

The free-market economist F. A. Hayek, himself in no sense an extremist, has written eloquently of the vital importance for the success of liberty of holding the pure and "extreme" ideology aloft as a never-to-be-forgotten creed. Hayek has written that one of the great attractions of socialism has always been the continuing stress on its "ideal" goal, an ideal that permeates, informs, and guides the actions of all those striving to attain it….Hayek is here highlighting an important truth, and an important reason for stressing the ultimate goal: the excitement and enthusiasm that a logically consistent system can inspire.22


Catholics can certainly subscribe to Rothbard's sentiment in "holding aloft" their own "never-to-be-forgotten creed" concerning true liberty. The Catholic creed of liberty is to be found in the doctrine handed down to them, not by liberal Jewish thinkers, but by the Church that God Incarnate founded to make disciples of all nations. We can only thank Dr. Chojnowski for standing in opposition to those, including misguided Catholics, who would advance another ideal of human society.

Mr. Ferrara is President and Chief Counsel of the American Catholic Lawyers Association, Inc., a religious organization dedicated to defending the civil rights of Catholics in litigation and public discourse. Mr. Ferrara's next book, Liberty, the God That Failed: The Church's Answer to Social and Economic Liberalism, will be published in June.

----------------------------------------------------------

1. "Mises Institute Supporters Summit: Radical Scholarship," http://_www.mises.org /upcomingstory.asp?control=68.

2. "The Unstoppable Rothbard," Jan. 7, 2005.

3. Rothbard, Murray, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 2002), p.4.

4. As Fr. Copleston observed, Suarez certainly taught that "God is, indeed, the author of the natural law; for he is Creator and He wills to bind men to observe the dictates of right reason." History of Political Philosophy, Vol. III, p.385. Without the divine will, natural law and natural rights as such cannot exist, for what obliges man to observe the "natural rights" of others if there is no God to impose the obligation? The later Scholastics merely emphasized the intrinsic goodness of the natural law against the nominalism of William of Occam, who held that the validity of the natural law depended solely on the arbitrary will of God, Who could, if He so willed, make murder a natural right.

5. Ethics of Liberty, p.43.

6. Ibid., p.42.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. See ("Ten Must Haves") http:// www.mises.org/store/category.asp7Customer ID= 848567 &ACBSessionID= euoZXmrhabgTmkMTw5DX&SID=2&Category JD=10; ("The Core") http://www.mises.org/ Study Guide Display.asp?SubjID=116. Like all doctrinaire liberals, Rothbard allowed that abortion and the willful starvation of children could be seen as morally wrong according to "personal ethics," but he insisted that the State has no right to prohibit such conduct.

10. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol.1, p.218 (concerning Plato's definition of the pursuit of virtue).

11. Libertas Praestantissimum, §6.

12. Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p.21.

13. See, e.g. Hans Hermann Hoppe, [I]Democracy: The God that Failed (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), p.247: "Widespread agreement exists among liberal-libertarians such as Molinari, Rothbard… as well as most other commentators on the matter that defense is a form of insurance and that defense expenditures represent a sort of insurance premium…the most likely candidates to offer protection and defense services [in place of government] are insurance agencies."

14. Ralph Raico, "The Austrian School and Classical Liberalism," at: mises.org/etexts/aus-trian liberalism.asp.

15. Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics, Excerpts from the Lehrbuch der Nationalokonomie (Oxford: University Press of America, 1998), p.218.

16. Ibid., p.475.

17. Michael Levin, "In Defense of Scrooge," Dec. 18, 2000, at http://www.mises.org/ fullstory.aspx?control=573.

18. John R. Lott, Jr., "Especially During Disasters," http://www.lewrockwell.com/lott /Iott29.html. Lott, apparently, is not a formal Austrian, but his arguments, published on this major Austro-Libertarian website, are typical of this school.

19. Murray Rothbard, Power and Market, Online Edition, p. 1363.

20. Libertas Praestantissimum, §10.

21. Ubi Arcano Dei, §§60-61.

©January 2005
Vol. XXVIII, Number 1
The Angelus

Read more...

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Capitalism and Catholic Economics Part One

by John Sharpe




INTRODUCTION

Those who advocate the Distributist model of Catholic economics are often criticized for having the audacity to suggest that there is something wrong with the scheme of liberal, industrial capitalism that began to develop in the West shortly before the so-called Reformation, and which blossomed after the French and Industrial Revolutions. Part of what exposes them to criticism from so-called "realistic," "practical," and "down-to-earth" minds is their unapologetic willingness to pass judgment on the modern economy based upon the quaint concepts of Reason, Revelation, and the Moral Law, rather than upon something "reliable" and "scientific" like charts, graphs, and statistics which allegedly reveal the workings of an economic law to which all of us are supposed to blindly submit.

Various camps of the more-or-less "conservative" Catholic milieu have been recently attacking the Distributist vision. Why bother attempting to discredit something that cannot possibly gain and hold possession of modern minds? And if the amount of criticism directed at Belloc & Co. is any indication of Distributism's popularity, then we can safely say that it must be making some kind of comeback.

Back in 1995, Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, in the April issue of his First Things, drew attention to the rather limited criticism of Distributism expressed by James K. Fitzpatrick.1 Fitzpatrick's criticism was not an attack on the intellectual rectitude of the Distributist position; he simply lamented that no one seemed to have a concrete, practical sense of how to implement it in the here and now. Fr. Neuhaus "elaborated" on Fitzpatricks's commentary by shifting the subject to a convenient and popular straw man: "It is a sloppy and widespread habit of mind," Neuhaus wrote, "that blames the failings of this or any other social order on 'capitalism.'" It would take several pages to explore all of the flaws in logic and common sense implicit in such a statement. Let it merely be said for the record, however, that "capitalism" is the social order of today; and-morally speaking-"capitalism" is a failure. This despite the fact that four years later, in the November issue, Fr. Neuhaus would suggest that modern capitalism has successfully incorporated much of what Chesterton was arguing for, and thus has become "notably distant from what Chesterton meant by the term."

Of more recent interest is the attempt to further defend capitalism (a defense which implicitly dismisses Distributism as simply wrong, wholly impractical, or both) by demonstrating, in the words of a recent writer for The Latin Mass, that it has been defended by "the greatest minds of the Church." Part and parcel of this defense is the assertion that the Spanish Scholastics of the 16th century were in some way "proto-liberals," "proto-Austrians," or "proto-Libertarians," thus implying that the liberal school of "free-market economics" actually traces its roots to-and is thus an accurate development of-Catholic Doctrine. The subject of the alleged "proto-capitalism" of the Spanish Catholics is surprisingly popular, and has come up in a number of places over the last few years. In March of this year, at a Conference of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, an attack was launched on the Social Doctrine of the Church and an apologia issued for free competition and the "beautiful order and harmony created by the free market" with a presentation allegedly based on the so-called "proto-liberal" Spanish Scholastics. Dismissing the traditional teaching of the Church, which doctrine formed the root of the Distributist vision, the speaker suggested that the "moral injunctions that comprise Catholic social teaching are based, at root, on economic misconceptions and factual error."

Such talk is simply following the lead of widely read columnists, such as Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., a Catholic whose libertarian website is advertised as "the premier anti-state/pro-market site on the net." In a 1995 article 3 he argued that the Late Scholastics were the true founders of "free-market economics." And an article defending freely negotiated labor rates, allegedly based on the teachings of the Spanish Scholastics, even appeared last year in an Australian paper featured an article defending freely negotiated labor rates, basing its arguments (allegedly) on the teachings of the Spanish Scholastics, and implying that what is sneeringly termed "economic rationalism" by "progressive clerics" is actually solid, Catholic economic thought.

Finally, in the pages of The Latin Mass magazine recently, a CEO of an investment firm launched a similar kind of attack, maintaining that Capitalism is the economic system that most conforms to the teaching of the Church, and condemning Belloc's own Distributist program as "inconsistent with the traditional teaching of the Church."

The last of the orthodox Catholic political economists, such as Charles Devas and Fr. Matteo Liberatore, wrote literally hundreds of pages in what they both considered to be mere introductory textbooks on economic science. It would, therefore, be supreme folly to claim to attempt any kind of thorough treatment of the subject in an article such as this. Nevertheless, a very brief examination of some of the most recent criticisms of Belloc's vision may help to point the way towards a more accurate and orthodox understanding of the Church's position vis-a-vis economic life. If Belloc's alleged error is the death-knell of Distributism and the triumph of the "free market," it stands to reason that a vindication of Belloc's position is the condemnation of liberal capitalism and a rehabilitation of Distributism.

Such a vindication, in the face of the most recent attacks on Belloc's position, is actually quite straightforward. This is so because these criticisms are based on what we may classify as two rather distinct kinds of erroneous observations; the first are attacks on Belloc's theory which are based on an incorrect or inaccurate representation of that theory, and the second are attacks on the Distributist vision which are themselves based on erroneous principles.

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BELLOC'S INTENT: A NEW THEORY

The first of the recent arguments that can be classified as misrepresentations of Belloc's theory is the assertion that Distributism is a "new theory" to which the world was introduced by Belloc with the 1936 publication of Restoration of Property (see p.38). Actually, Belloc used the term Distributism in his 1924 Economics for Helen; and therein he places Distributism in historical context by admitting that "Distributism" is the rather awkward term coined to explain what had been, throughout the history of the civilized West, a common phenomenon: the existence of widely distributed productive property, in the form of land or a trade or craft and the tools that go with it, privately owned and worked by individual families for the provisions of their basic needs and necessities. In Restoration of Property he explains that the transformation of society into its present form, one in which the ownership of productive property is concentrated in relatively few hands, began with the religious revolution of the 16th century that had destroyed the ancient walls which had protected the freedom of the human city.

The first great blow was the destruction of the Guilds, coupled with the seizure of collegiate property in all countries transformed by the Reformation, but most thoroughly and universally in England. This was followed up in England by a series of positive enactments of which that one called the Statute of Frauds was perhaps the chief instrument in destroying the English land-owning peasantry. The great efflorescence of Capitalism came after all that bad work had been done, and was only made possible by that bad work.

Prior to the publication of Restoration of Property, in his 1925 pamphlet entitled "The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property," he makes reference to the need to remedy industrial Capitalism with the widespread distribution of property. Meanwhile, G.K. Chesterton had by then been making references to the need for a more widespread distribution of property for over 15 years. And in making such references, Belloc and Chesterton were simply following in the footsteps of the great Catholics of the Catholic Social Movement 6 and of Pope Leo XIII who, in Rerum Novarum (1891), hoped that there would come a time when working people could "look forward to obtaining a share in the land".

The above should be alone sufficient to refute the notion that Distributism is "inconsistent with the traditional teaching of the Church." But let's continue our look at the specific arguments.

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BELLOC'S INTENT: A DEFINITION OF CAPITALISM

Recent critics object to the way in which Belloc defines Capitalism, as "a state of society in which a minority control the means of production, leaving the mass of the citizens dispossessed." When Belloc says that the mass of citizens are dispossesed, he is simply referring to the fact that most citizens sustain themselves based not upon their own labor applied to what they themselves own, but rather upon what they can earn in terms of wages, by hiring themselves out to work on another's capital. This definition, which has been called "simplistic" in a Catholic magazine recently, happens also to be that of Pius XI: "that economic system, wherein, generally, some provide capital while others provide labor for a joint economic activity."

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BELLOC'S INTENT: RADICAL EQUALITY

It is then suggested that the Distributist scheme would make it impossible for "any one individual to have much more than any other." This is simply false. Were Distributism a revolutionary "leveling" and a socialistic denial of inequality, it would be justly deserving of blame. But the persuasiveness of this critique is based not upon Belloc's position as it actually is, but upon his position as it is represented by his critics, who no doubt take unfair advantage of the fact that most of us do not have handy a copy of the actual text of Restoration of Property. A look at the text, however, dispels the myth that Distributism is an egalitarian, revolutionary, and quasi-socialist scheme.

Firstly, Belloc says clearly-and in more than one place-that a variety of levels of ownership obviously form part of the complexity of normal and healthy human society:

It cannot be too much repeated and insisted upon that the ideal of property does not comport equality in property-that mechanical ideal is contradictory of the personal quality attaching to property. It is not a bad but a good thing that rents, the dwelling house, the income from investment, and the rest, should be upon various scales, for such variety corresponds to the complex reality of human society.


Secondly, Belloc desires not to equalize wealth, but to protect the small farmer, the family landowner, the small craftsman, and the small retail trader. He thus advocates a scheme of "Differential Taxation 1) against chain stores; 2) against multiple shops; 3) against large retail turnover," in order to do just that. In no wise does Belloc propose (nor would his scheme produce) a system which would make it impossible for "any one individual to have much more than any other."

In assuming that this is the case, Belloc's critics confuse the issue between wealth used for production (capital, such as financial or that in land, tools, machinery, etc.] and wealth which is immediately consumed in meeting the needs of human life. If a man, by his initiative, ingenuity, or pure luck, is able to have a business that is more successful than the next, nothing will prevent him from enjoying the added benefits of his effort or good fortune, insofar as those benefits are reflected in increased profits, higher personal income, and more loyal patrons-which will ultimately procure for him more land, a nicer home, better food, more ample furnishings, etc. But the employment of that increased wealth in expanding, Wal-Mart style, to the point where the same wealth is being used to shut down the independent enterprises, making them dependent upon him or eliminating them completely-such a course would be discouraged by Belloc's scheme of taxation. Belloc's program is not a radical redistribution of wealth "rivaled only by Karl Marx and Leon Trotsky," as has been scandalously asserted. It is not a limit on natural inequalities, but a limit on unnatural concentration.

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BELLOC'S INTENT: TAXATION

Under this heading we should briefly mention the assertion, based on various condemnations of taxation culled from the writings of the Spanish Scholastics, that the greatest economic minds of the Church would have opposed Belloc's scheme to safeguard the small business man and small landholder. Consider three points in response:

1) The tradition of the Church has always been to support widely distributed property, and there is no reason to suspect that the Spanish Scholastics would have opposed the taking of measures to safeguard or restore that distribution. Those measures are in no way "confiscatory," as a recent critic claimed. Belloc himself condemns excessive taxation.

2) As we will see later on, the Church, in her magisterial teaching, has always granted to the state the power to regulate private property, and to take necessary steps to ensure that it is defended.

3) The citations from various theologians which allegedly prove that Belloc's scheme would have been repudiated by the Spanish Scholastics actually do nothing of the sort: they merely imply that, all things being equal, a sovereign cannot licitly tax one citizen more than others. The context obviously assumes a case in which a king might try to eliminate his political enemies by taxing them out of existence. Such a circumstance has absolutely nothing to do with Belloc's proposals. For Belloc himself, in Restoration of Property, condemns excessive taxation; he says that the institution of widely distributed property is itself a barrier against high taxation, and that high taxation is itself a tool which may be used to destroy widely distributed property:

High taxation is incompatible with the general institution of property. The one kills the other. Where property is well distributed resistance to big taxation is so fierce and efficacious that big taxation breaks down.

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BELLOC'S INTENT: SOCIALISM

Recent critics have elsewhere accused Belloc of advocating Socialism, by referring to a statement which reads as follows: "State ownership is better, of course, than ownership by a few very rich individuals." But this criticism is based upon two very serious errors: 1) Belloc's comment is taken grossly out of context, and 2) the rest of Belloc's writing (both the text of Restoration and his other works) must be ignored in order to make this point.

1) It will be sufficient to point out that Belloc makes the above-noted statement in reference to a specific, limited, narrow circumstance: he is discussing whether or not it is possible to have distributed property in the case of that "economic unit which has, from the nature of the instrument used, to be worked on a large scale; the classical example is the railway system." The context of Belloc's statement-the points he makes before and after the single, isolated sentence in question-reveals Belloc's true meaning: he is clearly suggesting that ownership by the state of a very large enterprise (such as a national postal service, a railroad, or such like) is to be considered only as a last resort (a last resort sanctioned by the Church), and that ownership by private shareholders or a Guild is obviously to be preferred:

In those cases where the instrument is necessarily very expensive we may, as I have said, adopt one of two methods: we may either promote the ownership of it into shares, the proper division of which and the saving of which from irresponsible control will be later discussed; or we may accept the principle of communal ownership, whether by a Guild or by the State, but under the general proviso that ownership by the State is better avoided where possible, because the private citizen has no control over the State as he has over the Guild.

State ownership is better, of course, than ownership by a few very rich individuals, or even the ownership by many small shareholders who are at the mercy of a few rich ones, as they are under our English company law, but there is always the danger in State ownership that the men who work for the State-owned instrument will turn, if they are not turned already, into wage slaves, without other support than the weekly provision made for them by their master-the State.


It is clear Belloc is not an advocate of Socialism.

2) Belloc's condemnations of Socialism, both in Restoration and elsewhere, should be well-known. It suffices to point out that Belloc speaks of the "Socialist fruit" of Capitalism in Restoration of Property with the same condemning language that he uses when speaking of Capitalism itself, and he makes his position perfectly clear in any number of other works, not the least of which is his pamphlet "The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private Property."11 What he thinks of Socialism is expressed therein with almost Chestertonian cleverness; nonetheless his meaning remains perfectly clear:

The short-cut to the relief of humanity from Industrial Capitalism is Socialism, that is, the denial of Private Property, especially in the means of production. So the short-cut out of the horrors of a false religion (especially if it be a cruel and base religion such as Puritanism) is materialism. So the short-cut out of an unhappy marriage is divorce. So the short-cut out of an unhappy life is suicide.


MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BELLOC'S INTENT: MEANS OF PRODUCTION

Critics also maintain that Belloc's vision would dictate that society consist of "millions of family businesses," and that his plan calls for a "redistribution of the means of production" which ignores the fact that not everyone alike possesses the same initiative and entrepreneurial skill. To so suggest is to miss the essential point.

As we have noted above, Belloc is not calling for some radical scheme of leveling, some smashing of factory equipment and handing out of corporate infrastructure to impoverished families in depressed economic areas. Nor does he deny, as some have implied, that managers and leaders of enterprises which require above-average skill, effort, and energy are entitled to a larger income; such a notion remains merely a question of wages that are tailored to compensate for a given amount of more-or-less complex and difficult labor. This has little to do with an examination of how productive property may be better distributed. It is obvious (certainly to Belloc) that higher wages are justly paid for more complicated, more demanding, or more risky work.

As a Distributist, however, Belloc is addressing himself to the problem of the common lot of men, which is to work for someone else for a wage, rather than for themselves for their sustenance. He is addressing the problem which Pius XII called "economic dependence and slavery." He is calling, primarily and principally, for the defense, the support, and the restoration of the craftsman, the small farmer, the small retailer. He is calling for what numerous Americans casually yet frequently hope for as consumers: a local coffee shop, as opposed to a Starbuck's; a family general store, rather than a 7-11; a personal hardware store, rather than Home Depot. And he is calling for what they should wish for as producers: the ability to depend upon themselves, their own capital, and their local community for their livelihood, and not solely upon their employers or the state.

In Belloc's defense, he does in fact reserve several pages for the treatment of how to handle large enterprises, which, by their very nature, would require both large amounts of capital and the direction of capable men. But his vision of how those capable men manage their respective industries is at issue, not what kind of wage they should receive for their trouble. His vision is a Catholic vision, not a social-Darwinist vision. Those large operations, he maintains, following the teaching of Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Pius XII, must be run in a manner consistent with the common good, and must serve the community by producing necessary commodities, in exchange for a fair profit, while at the same time respecting the proper economic order, which the Church has declared to be a wide distribution of productive property helping to constitute families in a requisite degree of economic freedom and security. From a Catholic standpoint there is no degree of "business savvy," "entrepreneurial vision," or "economic initiative" that gives a man who runs a huge corporation the right to eliminate another small business, bearing in mind that such a business may be the means whereby one or several men, as business owners, support their families without being forced necessarily to work for someone else in exchange for a wage.

In suggesting that "not everyone is capable of turning raw materials into actual products," certain critics must obviously imagine that Belloc's scheme applies exclusively to the question of who owns and manages factories, industry, and large-scale corporate life (which it does not), rather than how those operations are managed and how characteristic they are of society (in comparison with the prevalence of smaller, local, more personal economic activities). Furthermore, these same critics must be at a loss to explain how it is that Western Europeans, before the great age of industry and business conglomeration, managed to feed and clothe themselves, unable as the mass of them were to "turn raw materials into actual products."

COMPETITION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

Proponents of Capitalism suggest that Capitalism, as an economic system, implies also a regime of free competition between economic enterprises. They surmise that the principal way in which Distributism militates against the notion of "free enterprise" is in the way it understands the notion of private property and its use. In their way of thinking, the institution of private property includes the notion that private property may be used without restriction by the owner of the property. Distributism, they say, destroys that notion by limiting the way in which owners may use their property which eliminates-in an uncomfortable degree-the capitalist scheme of free competition.

Is the Distributist ideal of private property actually antithetical to it because it limits how private property may be used? Does someone who owns property have an unrestricted right to its use? Such an assertion would be surprising. One would not find it upheld in even the most liberal of societies. I am not allowed to commit murder with a knife that I own, simply because I own it, and am therefore entitled also to its use. Human laws and human institutions are limited by any number of considerations, both moral and legal, and sometimes both (as in this example). Any society wisely limits the use of private property: it remains solely to consider whether or not Distributism places such a degree of restriction on the use of private property that-as capitalists maintain-private ownership ceases to exist.

It is unfortunate that not everyone has a copy of Hilaire Belloc's book, The Restoration of Property because it is impossible in the short space of this article to accurately detail what kind of scheme he proposes. He proposes to defend the small landowner, the family farmer, the small craftsman, the small retailer, from being eaten up by the larger. What he is proposing is the checking of competition to the extent necessary to reverse the current trend: the tendency under a regime of free competition-a tendency which cannot honestly be denied-towards the growth of bigger and bigger economic enterprises at the expense of the smaller ones. Such a proposal by no means implies a stifling restriction on the use of property. Such a restriction does not even imply a limit on the amount of money that one can make through the enterprises and means of production that one already possesses. What it does imply is a restriction of the ability of a businessman to employ amassed wealth in an effort to eliminate his competitors, through outright purchase, or through "free market" competition. Such a businessman is discouraged under Distributism from transforming, without their truly free consent, his neighbors into his employees.

In conjunction with this objection, capitalists may make the heated assertion that traditional Catholic teaching is contrary to Distributism. Is it really? Belloc said "that unchecked competition must ultimately produce the rule of ownership by a few." So did Pope Pius XI:

This concentration of power and might, the characteristic mark, as it were, of contemporary economic life, is the fruit that the unlimited freedom of struggle among competitors has of its own nature produced, which lets only the strongest survive; and this is often the same as saying, those who fight the most violently, those who gave least heed to their conscience.


Belloc thought that free competition was not sufficient to regulate economic life in a way that allowed the masses to be secure in their property. He thus refers, in The Restoration of Property, to the historical fact that mankind has instinctively safeguarded itself against the danger of ownership by a few by the setting up of institutions for the protection of small property, and that these institutions have never broken down of themselves, but always and only under the conscious action of a deliberately hostile attack.

The popes also have admitted that competition was not sufficient in regulating economic life. Pope Pius XI said that,

Just as the unity of human society cannot be founded on an opposition of classes, so also the right ordering of economic life cannot be left to a free competition of forces. For from this source, as from a poisoned spring, have originated and spread all the errors of individualist economic teaching. Destroying through forgetfulness or ignorance the social and moral character of economic life, it held that economic life must be considered and treated altogether free and independent of public authority, because in the market, i.e., in the free struggle of competitors, it would have a principle of self-direction which governs it much more perfectly than would the intervention of any created intellect. But free competition, while justified and certainly useful provided it is kept within certain limits, clearly cannot direct economic life-a truth which the outcome of application in practice of the tenets of this evil individualist spirit has more than sufficiently demonstrated.


And Pope Pius XII observed that "the demands of competition, which is a normal consequence of human liberty and ingenuity, cannot be the final norm for economics."

Belloc proposed to use the legitimate power of the State to regulate economic life according to the common good. Pius XI, following Leo XIII, also maintained that the role of the State in economic life was to foster the common good.

With regard to civil authority, Pope Leo XIII, boldly breaking through the confines imposed by Liberalism, fearlessly taught that government must not be thought a mere guardian of law and of good order, but rather must put forth every effort so that,

...through the entire scheme of laws and institutions... both public and individual well-being may develop spontaneously out of the very structure and administration of the State [as quoted by Pope Pius XI from Rerum Novarum]


It is not only Belloc who saw the widespread ownership of property as an aspect of the common good which the authority of the State not only may but must foster. Leo XIII hoped for a time when working people could "look forward to obtaining a share in the land." The Catholic Encyclopedia, under the heading "Agrarianism," refers to not only the "uniform teaching and tradition of the Catholic Church on the lawfulness of private ownership of income-yielding property, whether it be named 'land' or 'capital,'" but also to the fact that Leo XIII "urged the diffusion of property as the mean between Socialism and Individualism, and that where possible each citizen should dwell secure in a homestead which, however humble, was his own." And even more recently, Pius XII has taught:

The dignity of the human person...requires normally as a natural foundation of life the right to the use of the goods of the earth. To this right corresponds the fundamental obligation to grant private ownership of property, if possible, to all...; and...legislation...must prevent the worker, who is or will be a father of a family, from being condemned to an economic dependence and slavery which is irreconcilable with his rights as a person. Whether this slavery arises from the exploitation of private capital or from the power of the state, the result is the same.


Finally, the Church, in a doctrine which Pius XI called "age-old," has always distinguished between the ownership and the use of private property; the former must be held as inviolable, and the latter as subject to the common good.

It follows from what We have termed the individual and at the same time social character of ownership, that men must consider in this matter not only their own advantage but also the common good. To define these duties in detail when necessity requires and the natural law has not done so is the function of those in charge of the State. Therefore, public authority, under the guiding light always of the natural and divine law, can determine more accurately upon consideration of the true requirements of the common good, what is permitted and what is not permitted to owners in the use of their property.


Therefore to regulate private property, in a scheme such as that proposed by the Distributists, is not to destroy the institution of private property, but to ensure both that it is implemented in society in a way consistent with the common good, and that the widest possible number can enjoy its fruits. To so regulate that institution is not to destroy it, but to preserve it:

Yet when the State brings private ownership into harmony with the needs of the common good, it does not commit a hostile act against private owners but rather does them a friendly service; for it thereby effectively prevents the private possession of goods, which the Author of nature in His most wise providence ordained for the support of human life, from causing intolerable evils and thus rushing to its own destruction; it does not destroy private possessions, but safeguards them; and it does not weaken private property rights, but strengthens them.


CATHOLIC ECONOMIC DOCTRINE REGARDING PROFIT

The last objection of capitalists which bears refutation is the accusation that Distributism removes the "profit motive" from economic life, thus bringing it to a halt.

The first problem with such a position is that no where does Distributism condense its scheme to such a neat and tidy proposition. Distributism seeks to protect the small economic enterprise from ruin at the hands of the larger ones. Its purpose is not to restrict the amount of wealth that one can possess, but rather the amount of productive property one can employ when that employment directly affects the ability of the smaller operation to survive. It is crucial to bear in mind the distinction between the simple possession of property and its use in the public sphere.

A second distinction that is ignored at our peril is the one between wealth for consumption, such as food, clothing, luxuries, and "capital" (generally speaking) destined for personal use (such as land, automobiles, etc., which are not rented but used), and the wealth of capital (strictly speaking), which is employed in order to produce more wealth and generate income. It is the "wealth of capital" that is used by the great corporations to "get ahead" and smash the small businessman; it is the "wealth of capital" that must be regulated if a widespread distribution of ownership of income-generating property is to survive. No one is suggesting that it is sinful to be rich in itself (though it may be noted in passing that, compared to warnings and condemnations, praise of the rich is rather scanty in both Scripture and the writings of theologians). What Distributism condemns is a use-intentional or otherwise-of riches which deprives smaller property-owners of their ability to generate income without having to work for a wage. Without understanding this distinction, we would be at a loss to know why Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI (to name just two) denounced so vehemently the "immense power and despotic economic dictatorship [that] is consolidated in the hands of a few."

Distributism teaches that the "profit motive," as it is imagined by modern economists, is a concept which is hardly acceptable to Catholic theologians.

We do well to glance quickly at the teaching of St. Thomas on the role of material goods in man's life. First, they are ordained to a specific end, which is the upkeep of himself and his family:

"Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them." Furthermore, the fulfillment of man's needs does not serve its own purpose but rather facilitates the practice of virtue, which itself is ordained to the attainment of heaven:

That a man may lead a good life, two things are required. The chief requisite is virtuous action....The other requisite, which is secondary and quasi-instrumental in character, is a sufficiency of material goods, the use of which is necessary for virtuous action.


Based upon these principles, St. Thomas explains the licit motives for commercial activity as follows:

The other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit...

[This] gain which is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment for his labor.


The "profit motive" is licit, then, only insofar as the motive for the profit is the becoming upkeep of a household, the support and care of the poor, or as a just wage in exchange for a productive service rendered, which is good in itself. Can it be honestly maintained that such a concept is the motive that economists have in mind when they speak of "maximizing profits?"

No doubt the determination of what is necessary and what is excessive in the upkeep of a household is largely a matter of prudence. No doubt that many Catholics are satisfied with a reasonable wage, which they then employ in the upkeep of their households. But the legitimate increase in income and property which results from the practice of an honest trade is not what Distributism seeks to limit. Rather it is the massive concentration of capital and financial wealth that results from unrestricted economic competition which Distributism seeks to manage. It is the personal craft, the independent retailer, and the homestead which Distributism seeks to defend by placing Home Depot, Wal-Mart, and agri-business, et al., under reasonable economic control. If such controls militate against the "profit motive" of modern economic man, then perhaps economic man must re-evaluate his motives in light of the teaching of the Church.

Distributism is broadly thought of, by its advocates, as an implementation of the Social Doctrine of the Church. It is so because it is a program that is consistent with the natural law and, because, in the final analysis, it will help man along the path to heaven rather than throw him off it.

The essence of the Social Doctrine is that society is a means to an end. The duty of the State is to protect and foster the moral and material goods of this life (which collectively are known as the "temporal common good") in service of the ultimate end-the eternal salvation of men. As a result, every law, custom, and ordinance of the earthly community is salutary insofar as it makes man's journey to heaven easier, and is disordered whenever it makes that journey more difficult.

In light of that most important of all truths of Catholic Social Doctrine, it should be easy to see that Distributism is consistent with the Catholic economic vision insofar as it subordinates economic life to the ultimate purpose of man's life. It does not curtail the right of a man to own and use his private property. Its entire program is designed to safeguard and defend that right and to ensure that most if not all in society are able to benefit from it. But defending private property assumes that there is something to defend it against: which is the notion that private property is an end in itself, to be amassed and multiplied and owned without limit.

"The art of amassing wealth," says St. Thomas Aquinas, "which is solely concerned with money, is infinite." Where that art is pursued for its own sake, where it is governed by a "profit motive" which possesses no built-in limit but is rather an end unto itself, it leads simply and directly to yet further desire for wealth: "Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible." The incarnation of that mentality is the modern economic system which not only encourages in its philosophy the unlimited acquisition of wealth, but sanctions in its practice an expanding field of ownership by a few at the expense of widespread and distributed ownership by many. It is this scheme of things that Distributism opposes and for which it offers a remedy, that by the restoration of property to the non-owning masses it might also effect a restoration of economic life in its proper place, subordinate to the real needs of man and to the just decrees of God.

Seattle Catholic
©Copyright 2001-2006 Seattle Catholic. All Rights Reserved
September 06, 2002

Read more...

Interview with Thomas Storck

On Cooperative Ownership

John Médaille Interview in Romania

Download Web Counter

  © Blogger templates Newspaper III by Ourblogtemplates.com 2008

Back to TOP